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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act1 (CERCLA, also known as
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)) [hereinafter CERCLA]. See generally Jones & Mc-
Slarrow,... But Were Afraid to Ask: Superfund Case Law 1981-1989, 19 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10430, 10430 (Oct. 1989) (for" an exciting dash through the case law of
the last eight years"); Note, CERCLA 1980-1985: A Research Guide, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q.
2
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"Superfund") at the height of public concern during the Environmen-
tal Decade.2 Even before its implementation, CERCLA was touted as
the most frightening3 and promising4 of all environmental statutes. In
retrospect, both of the early predictions ring true. In fact, CERCLA
represents the product of a Congress unable to collect its thoughts.5
Nonetheless, CERCLA is effective-devastatingly so.8
This Article proposes that zealous application of pervasive CER-
CLA liability results in an undesirable environmental impact in that
the Act causes the unnecessary selection of undeveloped land as the
situs for future industrial growth. To address this concern, the Article
begins by defining in some detail the broad range of CERCLA liability
and demonstrating the extraordinary difficulty of avoiding the CER-
CLA trap. The focus then turns to a description of the various re-
sponses of parties affected by CERCLA liability as they have at-
tempted to ameliorate the negative impacts of this absolute liability.
As will be explained, much of this amelioration actually increases the
311 (1986).
2. Although "Environmental Score" seems more accurate on the twentieth anniver-
sary of the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), "Environmental
Decade" still is commonly used. E.g., Note, Federal Preemption of Local PCB Ordi-
nance Under the Toxic Substance Control Act-Rollins Environmental Services (FS),
Inc. v. Parish of St. James, 35 U. KAN. L. REv. 461 (1987).
3. A Legal Time Bomb for Corporations, Bus. Wy-, June 16, 1980, at 150.
4. See Wicker, Beginning the Cleanup, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1980, at E17, col.2.
5. See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings Re Alleged PCB
Pollution, 675 F. Supp. 22, 25 n.2 (D. Mass. 1987) (CERCLA is a prominent member of
that group of statutes which "achieve a certain quirky notoriety precisely because they
are so badly drafted as to be virtually incomprehensible."); United States v. Mottolo, 605
F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985) ("CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for
vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history.");
Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1310 n.12 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (CER-
CLA's awkwardness "may be explained by the context of [its] passage. CERCLA was
rushed through a lame duck session of Congress, and therefore, might not have received
adequate drafting."); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
("[CERCLA] leaves much to be desired from a syntactical standpoint, perhaps a reflec-
tion of the hasty compromises.. . . [Tihe legislative history is unusually riddled by self-
serving and contradictory statements."); see also Jones & McSlarrow, supra note 1, at
10430 ("[CERCLA was] both badly drafted and, to the glee of lawyers, silent on many
important issues."); Murphy, The Impact of "Superfund" and Other Environmental
Statutes on Commercial Lending and Investment Activities, 41 Bus. LAW. 1133, 1138
(1986) ("the statute is widely recognized as bearing the earmarks of hasty drafting and
last-minute political compromise").
6. Mulcahy, Free Market EIL Initiatives Urged, NAT'L UNDERWITER, Mar. 23,
1987, at 5 "'The statutes have cost carriers and insureds a bundle, but they've been
extremely effective in cleaning up sites."' Id. (quoting Michael Murphy, CEO, Environ-
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consumption of undeveloped land.1 Finally, the Article presents a draft
proposal for preventing this needless consumption while retaining the
full positive force of CERCLA liability.
II. DEFINING CERCLA LIABmTY
A. How Does CERCLA Work?
CERCLA imposes strict liability on statutorily identified parties.
These parties are known as "responsible parties." Among these parties,
liability is joint and several unless the harm caused is divisible.8 Upon
the passage of CERCLA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
received a Congressional mandate to identify polluted sites at which
cleanup is necessary.9 The press commonly refers to these sites as
Superfund sites, although CERCLA refers to them as facilities.10 The
EPA then must rank the sites in cleanup priority," which is set
through a methodology known as the Hazard Ranking System (HRS).1
2
After ranking, the EPA attempts to identify Potentially Responsi-
ble Parties (PRPs) for each site. If site conditions permit, the EPA will
grant the PRPs time to negotiate a cleanup plan among themselves. If
the PRPs are unable to resolve their differences and cleanup the site
themselves, or if the EPA determines health concerns require unde-
layed cleanup, then the EPA will take prompt action.
This action can take the form of a cleanup order issued to any one
of the PRPs, 5 or, alternatively, the EPA may issue a contract to have
the site cleaned using government funds. In the latter case the Hazard
Response Trust Fund, the so-called "Superfund," supplies the money
7. See infra pp. 807-12; see also Shumate, Environmental Law: An Emerging
Threat to Financial Institutions, BANi ADMIN., Feb. 1987, at 45 ("the cure may be al-
most as bad as the disease").
8. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (liability of responsible
parties); see Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 799 F.2d 1312, 1316
(9th Cir. 1986) ("Congress imposed strict but not absolute liability under CERCLA.");
United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 994
(D.S.C. 1984) (CERCLA liability is joint and several unless defendant proves grounds for
division).
9. See CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
10. See CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
11, CERCLA § 105(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(b) (Supp. V 1987).
12. CERCLA § 105(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c) (Supp. V 1987).
13. CERCLA § 106(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)-(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). These
sections authorize the EPA to require cleanup of the site and to impose fines of up to
$25,000 per day for failure to comply. Additionally, noncomplying PRPs are subject to
triple the amount the EPA incurs in cleaning up the facility. CERCLA § 107(c)(3), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
[Vol. 41
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to pay for the cleanup.14 The EPA then may sue all or any one of the
PRPs it selects for recovery of the entire amount expended on the
site.15 The selected PRP then has an action for contribution against
other PRPs, but it must bear the burden of proving its case.
1 6
The EPA bases its selection of a defendant on two criteria. First,
the EPA considers its own ability to prove its case against the PRP.
Second, it considers the PRP's ability to compensate the fund.1  Prov-
ing the case requires that the EPA show:
(1) the site meets the broad definition of "facility";' s
(2) there is a release" or threatened release
20 of
14. See CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
15. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The text of the
statute reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were dis-
posed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for dis-
posal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated
by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites se-
lected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release
which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall
be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, in-
cluding the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss result-
ing from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under section 9604(i) of this title.
Id.
16. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
17. McMahon, Lender's Perspectives on Hazardous Waste and Similar Liabilities,
18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10368, 10369 (Sept. 1988) (noting that it is "self-
evident" that the government will seek the deep pocket).
18. The definition of facility is so broad as to include almost anything except water-
craft and consumer products in consumer use, which are specifically excluded. See CER-
CLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
19. CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
20. CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
1990]
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(3) a "hazardous substance";21
(4) the defendant is a "covered person"; 22 and
(5)the plaintiff (usually the EPA) incurred costs of response" con-
sistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP).
24
A "covered person" includes anyone who owns or operates the
site.2 5 An owner or operator of the site can include lessees, sublessors, 26
innocent purchasers who acquired property without knowledge of ex-
isting contamination,27 lenders who foreclosed on mortgages 28 or who
became involved in operations,29 and even municipalities that simply
contracted for landfill services.30
The EPA's proof for liability is relatively easy to demonstrate. It
follows that "ability to prove the case" is not a significant criterion in
the selection of a particular PRP to sue. Therefore, the remaining cri-
terion, size of assets, becomes determinant. Hence, CERCLA has ac-
quired the propensity for being called a deep pocket nightmare
31
21. CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
22. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
23. CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
24. CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Consistency with the
National Contingency Plan (NCP) arguably means something different for the govern-
ment than it does for a private plaintiff. When the EPA is the plaintiff, the defendant
has the burden of demonstrating some inconsistency with the NCP. United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 747 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). In a case between private litigants, the plaintiff must show his
remedial action (1) provided for appropriate site investigation and analysis of remedial
alternatives; (2) complied with the NCP format for Remedial Investigations (RI's); (3)
constituted a cost effective response; and (4) provided an opportunity for public com-
ment. 40 C.F.R. § 300.71(a)(ii) (1989). See Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F.
Supp. 1563, 1575 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Martin, Lucy & Green, Private Cost-Recovery Actions
under CERCLA § 107, 1 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 377 (1989).
25. CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
26. See United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp.
984, 1003 (D.S.C. 1984).
27. See infra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
30. Under section 101(21) a "person" for the purposes of the statute includes a
"State, municipality, commission, [and] political subdivision of a State." CERCLA §
101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). A state or municipality that ac-
quires title to a facility involuntarily, however, (e.g., through tax delinquency) is exempt
from CERCLA liability unless the municipality "has caused or contributed to the release
,.. [and] such a State or local government shall be subject to the provisions of this
chapter ... including liability under section 9607." CERCLA § 101(20)(d), 42 U.S.C. §
9601(20)(d) (Supp. V 1987). See Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp.
1269 (D. Del. 1987), aft'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1983); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan
Chem. Co. 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
31. Many PRP's have identified concern with the EPA's "selective pursuit of the
deep pocket companies regardless of how much they contributed to the problem." Ren-
[Vol. 41
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Potentially Responsible Parties are liable for (1) costs to the gov-
ernment of removal or remedial action, (2) costs of response incurred
consistent with the NCP, (3) damages to natural resources, and (4)
costs for any health assessments.32 The potential for extensive liability
is so great and the number of litigants so many,3 3 otherwise burden-
some individual litigation costs are often considered nominal.3 4 This
creates a willingness to litigate ad nauseam the damages issue, thus
leading to CERCLA's reputation as a litigious morass. Recognizing this
problem, Congress amended CERCLA in 1986 and sought to promote
settlements by permitting the government to grant various forms of
release agreements. 5 The EPA, however, has nonreviewable discre-





Several defenses or partial barriers to liability may be available to
CERCLA defendants or PRPs, but these have very narrow application.
The statute expressly defines three defenses: (1) act of God; 8 (2) act of
war;39 and (3) act or omission of a third party.40 Note that these de-
nie, Superfund Disputes and the Role of Clean Sites, Inc., 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10263, 10265 (July 1987)).
32. CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
33. Practitioners should be wary that the "sheer numerosity of parties" in a CER-
CLA action creates significant opportunity for conflicts of interest. Smith, Legal Ethics:
Conflicts of Interest in a CERCLA Matter, in TaE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULA-
TION ON BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A SATELLFr PROGRAM (Practicing Law Institute Real
Estate Law and Practice No. 316) 211, 213 (A. Nucciarone ch. 1988) [hereinafter IMPACT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS No. 316].
34. For example, an expenditure of $400,000 just to identify other PRPs was consid-
ered a "prudent investment" in a case involving $80 million in cleanup costs. See Gra-
ham, Minimizing Legal and Cleanup Costs at Hazardous Waste Sites, in PRACTICAL
APPROACHES TO REDUCE ENVIRONM NTAL CLEANUP COSTS (Practicing Law Institute Real
Estate Law and Practice No. 317) 29, 44 (M. Italiano & D. Telego cbs. 1988).
35. See CERCLA § 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (Supp. V 1987) (as added by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1678 (1986)).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Cook & Gruenthal, Federal and State Superfund and Settlement Pro-
visions, in THE LAWS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE § 13.01[5][d], at 13-52 (1989) (citing reopener
clause to consent decree for Keefe site in New Hampshire).
38. CERCLA § 107(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The statute
defines an act of God as "an unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural phe-
nomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresitable character, the effects of which
could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight." CER-
CLA § 101(1), 42 U.S.C. 9601(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
39. CERCLA § 107(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
40. CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Practically,
this defense is limited to the actions of "midnight dumpers" on another's property. Even
in that case, a pattern of dumping without action by the owner to prevent the activities
might lead to liability.
1990]
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fenses are available only for liability arising out of section 107 that is
related to section 104 response costs. The defenses are not available to
defeat an EPA order to clean a site issued under authority of section
106.41 In fact, the statute denies federal district courts jurisdiction to
review orders issued under section 106.42
Several other defenses are scattered throughout the statute as
well. One of these is the innocent landowner defense, which is simply a
form of the third-party defense hidden in the definition of "contractual
relationship."''4 The requirements for the defense, however, appear" to
be so stringent that "[i]t will likely be difficult for anyone to establish
a position as an innocent landowner.' 45 One case in which the defense
was invoked successfully is United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot,
Inc.4' The case involved five relatives of the site's former owner who
received title through stock transfer and quitclaim deed. The court
held that the innocent landowner defense was applicable because the
defendants neither knew nor had reason to know of PCB releases at
the site.47 Lack of knowledge, however, may be difficult for most de-
fendants to establish.
Other potential defenses include a "federally permitted release,
48
an excluded release,49 a response action contractor defense,50 a right to
contribution from other PRPs,51 a de minimis settlement,52 and bank-
41. Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310 (2d. Cir. 1986) (holding that federal
district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review section 106 orders).
42. See CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (Supp. V 1987). An action by the
EPA to enforce a section 106(a) order, however, is subject to review. See CERCLA §
113(h)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
43. See CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
44. The language is so nondescript that Representative Weldon (R-Pa.) recently in-
troduced a bill (H.R. 2787) that would establish specific guidelines for a purchaser to
follow. For Representative Weldon's comments on the bill, see 135 CONG. REC. E2367
(daily ed. June 28, 1989).
45. R. Marzulla, Keynote Address, in BURDENS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ON
PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: REASONABLE OR UNREASONA-
BLE?, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, MAY
15-16, 1987, at 3 (ABA 1988) [hereinafter BURDENS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION].
46. 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989).
47. Id. at 1348-49.
48. CERCLA § 101(10), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(10) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
49. CERCLA § 101(22)(A)-(D), 42 U.S.C. 9601(22)(A)-(D) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
50. CERCLA § 119(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9619(a) (Supp. V 1987) This defense provides
that an entity contracting with the EPA under section 104 shall not be liable for damage
caused by the release necessitating the response action. The defense, however, is not
applicable if the response contractor causes the release through negligence, gross negli-
gence or intentional misconduct. CERCLA § 119(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9619(b) (Supp. V 1987).
51. CERCLA § 113(0, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
52. CERCLA § 122(g), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). For an example
summary of a de minimis settlement, see Notice of Proposed Consent Decree pertaining
[Vol. 41
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ruptcy.5 3 Despite these additional defenses, however, CERCLA liability
remains a virtually invincible force.
B. Liability Standard
Although CERCLA expressly specifies who is liable for cleanup
costs it fails to establish the standard for liability.5" Initially, the argu-
ment was raised that liability should attach only when the plaintiff has
proven negligence.55 Courts rejected this argument, however, and since
established that "strict" liability applies.56
One way to approach CERCLA liability is by comparison to the
common law tort liability analysis of duty, breach, causation and dam-
ages. The comparison highlights the differences between CERCLA's
apparent strict liability and other less adhesive schemes of imposing
liability.
1. Duty: Hazardous Substances
CERCLA imposes multiple duties.57 It exacts the most significant
to United States v. Adac, No. 89-0306S (D. Mass. Feb. 9, 1989), in 54 Fed. Reg. 7,489
(1989) (consent decree filed with district court on Feb. 9, 1989).
53. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985). The Kovacs court was presented with the
question of whether a person deemed liable for cleanup costs may discharge that obliga-
tion through a personal bankruptcy proceeding. The Court held that to the extent the
liability represented a debt, the bankruptcy proceeding provided a discharge. Id. at 285.
Firms that simply reorganize under Chapter 11, however, still make viable defendants.
See Johns-Manville Agrees To Pay $3 Million To Settle Federal Suit on Asbestos
Cleanup, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1459 (Dec. 26, 1986).
An issue addressed by the Supreme Court in a later case was whether a trustee in
bankruptcy may abandon a facility, thereby preserving the debtor's assets for the benefit
of its creditors. Of course, this leaves the municipality or state to pay for the facility
cleanup. In Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Pro-
tection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986), the Court held that a bankruptcy court may not authorize
abandonment pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code when such an abandonment would con-
travene state statutes designed to protect the health and safety of its citizens. Id. at 507.
For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Note, Bankruptcy in Trustee May Not
Abandon Property in Contravention of a State Statute or Regulation That Is Designed
to Protect the Public From Identified Hazards, 12 U. BALT. L. REV. 558 (1988).
54. See CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
For the text of section 107, see supra note 15.
55. Hayes & MacKerron, Superfund II: A New Mandate, 17 Env't Rep. 1735 (BNA)
pt. II, at 23 (Feb. 13, 1987).
56. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 n.1 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989).
57. CERCLA duties include the duty to report releases, CERCLA § 103, 42 U.S.C. §
9603 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), and to prevent pollutant releases which may present sub-
stantial danger to public health or welfare. CERCLA § 104(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. §
1990]
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duty from those who handle, or have unwittingly handled in the past,"8
a category of chemicals denoted as hazardous substances. 9 An impor-
tant step in comprehending the far-reaching impact of CERCLA re-
quires a practical understanding of the all-inclusive nature of the term
"hazardous substance." The relative harmlessness of some of these
"hazards" can be quite startling. Many hazardous substances are in
routine household use.60 The public handles these "hazards" without
concern even though the concentrations may be much greater than ex-
ist at many Superfund sites."' For example, acetone 2 is a major ingre-
dient in fingernail polish remover; benzene6 3 is a major constituent of
super-unleaded gasolines; and phosphoric acid" is an ingredient in
Coca-Cola. People handle these materials, contact their skin with these
materials, and indeed consume these materials daily; yet, the materials
are deemed hazardous substances. Their use in a nonconsumer set-
9604(a)(1)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). If the pollutant involved is a designated hazardous
substance, then the danger is irrebuttably presumed. See CERCLA § 104(a)(1)(A), 42
U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
58. S. BRIGGUM, G. GOLDMAN, D. SQUIRE & D. WEINBERG, HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULA-
TION HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO RCRA AND SUPERFUND 98 (1987) [hereinafter S.
BRIGGUM].
59. CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) The term haz-
ardous substance includes: all chemicals that are listed as hazardous substances or toxic
pollutants under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 132(b)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987);
all chemicals listed as hazardous wastes under the Solid Waste Disposal Act (more com-
monly known by its amendment name, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
"RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); all chemicals listed as toxic sub-
stances under the Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1988); all chemicals
listed as hazardous air pollutants under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982); and
any chemicals that the EPA administrator determines to list exclusively under CERCLA.
A reasonably current list of these chemicals is set out in 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1989).
60. Lyon, Household Wastes Can Be Hazards, Too, Portland Press Herald (Maine),
Dec. 21, 1987 (mothballs, oven cleaner, gun-cleaning solvents, paint thinner, bug spray,
furniture polish, floor-care products, kerosene, used motor oil and metal polish with sol-
vent are all hazardous substances); see also Study Finds Significant Hazardous Waste
in Household Garbage, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY REPORT, Oct. 9, 1987, at 15 (batteries, elec-
trical equipment, cosmetics, and household maintenance supplies are all hazardous sub-
stances); Hamilton, A Nasty Scrap Over Toxic Household Waste, Bus. WK., Sept. 21,
1987, at 35 (bug spray, used motor oil and nearly dried paint cans are all hazardous
substances).
61. Cf. McMahon, Lender's Perspectives on Hazardous Waste and Similar Liabili-
ties, in BURDENS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 45, at 22 ("Homeowners
may have more contaminants in their garages than many companies subject to multimil-
lion dollar cleanups have on their grounds.").
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tings5 can subject an ever-widening range of individuals and corpora-
tions to tremendous liability.
In short, the requirement that a site contain hazardous substances
is not much of a requirement. It is not unreasonable to assume that
every business66  and household6  in America uses hazardous
substances.
2. Breach: Threat of Release
CERCLA authorizes more than one type of action when either a
hazardous substance is released or a substantial threat of release exists.
First, the EPA may issue an administrative order to a responsible
party to clean the site. The authority for such orders arises from sec-
tion 106 of CERCLA, and requires the EPA to determine that there is
substantial endangerment caused by the threat of release. Review of
the Agency's determination is generally unavailable s.6  Failure to com-
ply with such orders can result in treble damages.6 9
Alternatively, the EPA, or a private party, may choose to clean or
at least secure the site themselves. This is a section 104 response, and
it is generally divided into two steps. The first is a removal action,
which addresses immediate public health concerns. The second, and
more thorough, is the remedial action. Remedial actions involve less
pressing public health concerns, but are often more costly and subject
to greater review. While both parts must comply with the National
Contingency Plan (NCP) to be compensable, the remedial action is a
much more formal process. 0 A Remedial Investigation and Feasibility
Study (RIIFS) or its equivalent is required.1
Both of these actions, however, require at least a "substantial
65. See CERCLA § 101(9)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (defi-
nition of "facility" that can be liable for production of hazardous waste under CERCLA
excludes consumer products in consumer use).
66. Shea, Protecting Lenders Against Environmental Risks, PRAc. REAL EST. LAW.,
May 1987, at 11, 13 ("almost all manufacturing industries, and even some service indus-
tries, are major users of hazardous substances").
67. See supra note 60.
68. See Mays, Who's Afraid of CERCLA § 106 Administrative Orders? or Separat-
ing the Men from the Boys, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1926, 1927 (Jan. 27, 1989) ("there is no
way for a PRP to obtain speedy review of a § 106 order in U.S. district court").
69. See United States v. Parsons, 723 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
70. See Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1576 (E.D. Pa.
1988) (The "distinction between remedial and removal actions is crucial in certain cases
where the failure to fulfill the more detailed procedural and substantive provisions of the
NCP with regard to 'remedial' actions becomes a barrier to recovery of response costs.").
71. 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(d) (1989). The NCP was significantly expanded on March 8,
1990. 55 Fed. Reg. 8,665 (1990).
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threat of release into the environment. '72 While "release" is defined in
the statute,7 3 the real determination of substantial threat would seem
to rest with the fact finder.74 The substantial threat, however, need not
be a threat to health, but only a threat of release-and the release
need not actually occur.
7 5
3. Causation?
The next element of comparison is causation, the third step in the
classic tort analysis. Quite simply, none is required.76 The chemical de-
posited need not be the same chemical that is threatening release.
77
Some commentators have described this as "very flexible causation, 78
but that seems an understatement. As Judge Newcomer observed in
United States v. Wade,7 9 a leading case, "the release which results in
the incurrence of response costs and liability need only be of 'a' haz-
ardous substance and not necessarily one contained in the defendant's
waste."80
4. Damages: Response Costs
Damages, the fourth step in the analysis, are somewhat unusual
under CERCLA liability, because the plaintiff (usually the EPA) has
the ability, from the defendant's perspective, to actually create a dam-
age figure. The EPA does so in two steps: (1) it incurs costs after estab-
lishing that a response is necessary; and (2) it establishes the amount
of cleanup required, thus determining the amount of response costs.
Arguments arise as to when an impact has been remediated; this is the
72. See CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
73. See CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (release
includes "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, in-
jecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment").
74. See 47 Fed. Reg. 31,180 (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 300.6 (1988) (explanation of EPA).
75. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir.
1989).
76. Rogers, Three Years of Superfund, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10361,
10363 (Nov. 1983) ("Liability Without Causation: The Last Straw .. . [N]o legal issue
has so aroused the ire of lawyers representing potentially responsible parties.").
77. United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984,
999 (D.S.C. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v. Monsanto
Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); United States v.
Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
78. S. BRIGGUM, supra note 58, at 99.
79. 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
80. Id. at 1333 (emphasis in original).
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difficult "how clean is clean?" question."' The level of "clean" deter-
mines the cost of cleanup.
8 2
CERCLA also gives the EPA authority to order cleanup by re-
sponsible parties under section 106. Failure to comply with the cleanup
order subjects the party to treble damages.83
C. Retroactivity
The statute apparently was intended to be retroactive, and courts
have held that CERCLA carries adequate indicia of Congressional in-
tent"' to override the presumption against retroactivity.85 Nevertheless,
commentators have argued that the retroactivity is so extensive as to
be unconstitutional.86 The Supreme Court, more than once, has de-
81. Epley, Federal and State Regulation of Activities Affecting Water Quality, in
THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ON BusNEss TRANSACTIONS: REAL PROP-
ERTY TRANSFERS AND MERGERS AND AcQuISrriONS (Practicing Law Institute Real Estate
Law and Practice No. 286) 99, 146 (A. Nucciarone ch. 1986) [hereinafter IMPACT OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL REGULATIONS No. 286] ("There is no clear law ... which establishes uniform
specific numerical thresholds for various chemicals for the purpose of guiding cleanup of
soil, surface water or groundwater in all cases."); see Sheridan, How Clean is Clean:
Standards for Remedial Actions at Hazardous Waste Sites Under CERCLA, 6 STAN.
ENvTL. L.J. 9 (1986-87).
82. See Mang, A Review of Technical Approaches to a Cleanup, INDuS. DEV., Mar.!
Apr. 1986, at 5.
83. CERCLA § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. 9607(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); see Solid
State Circuits v. EPA, 812 F.2d 383, 388 (8th Cir. 1987). Congress established a cause of
action allowing the EPA, in its discretion, to bring a claim in federal district court to
recover up to three times the amount of any costs incurred by the Superfund from any
person who is liable for a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance and who
fails without sufficient cause to properly comply with the EPA's order. Id. at 388. With
enactment of SARA, Congress altered the language slightly so that parties might avoid
damages if they had sufficient cause to violate the order. See CERCLA § 106(b), 42
U.S.C. § 9606(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). In addition, SARA permits recipients of section
106 orders to petition for reimbursement from the Superfund. CERCLA § 106(b)(2)(A),
42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The reimbursement option is not ret-
roactive, however. See Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 709 F. Supp. 249, 252-53 (D.D.C. 1989).
84. Then Congressman David Stockman, in framing an argument against the enact-
ment of CERCLA, provided a hypothetical situation in which a company could be held
liable under the statute for 30-year-old contributions to a site. See 126 CONG. REc. 26,786
(1980). Obviously, Mr. Stockman's argument proved unpersuasive, manifesting congres-
sional intent to enact such liability. As a consequence, parties find themselves in the
predicted trap. For example, a North Dakota site (Lidgerwood) results from activities
carried on in the 1930s to prevent grasshopper infestation. See Site Work Continues,
SUPERFUND Rm'. (Inside Washington) 11 (June 10, 1987).
85. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1314 (N.D. Ohio
1983).
86. Freeman, Inappropriate and Unconstitutional Retroactive Application of
Superfund Liability, 42 Bus. LAW. 215 (1986).
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clined review of the issue. 7
Retroactivity means that "companies are now liable for damages
resulting from waste management practices many years ago, regardless
of whether any problems were foreseeable, the company acted in good
faith, or state-of-the-art waste management practices were used."' s
Even though the EPA may choose to sue or force cleanup by the pre-
sent owner of a site, past owners may be liable for contribution. The
action in contribution may be based on an indemnification clause in
the contract of sale, " but it need not be.
In Sunnen Products Co. v. Chemtech Industries"° Judge Gunn
found Chemtech Industries' sale of property to Sunnen was not subject
to the defense of caveat emptor. 1 While the opinion did not abandon
the need for the buyer to beware, it certainly carried the message to
industry that the seller 92 need also be wary. In dicta, however, Judge
Gunn noted that "[c]ourts have upheld agreements to transfer liability
for potential toxic contamination from sellers to purchasers of property
to defeat private claims under CERCLA." 3
It is not too surprising that parties will be held liable for actions
occurring prior to CERCLA's enactment but resulting in government
response costs after its enactment. Consider, however, the case in
which "costs of responding to conditions at a hazardous waste site...
were incurred prior to the 1980 enactment." 4 The Eighth Circuit,
when presented with such facts, ruled that retroactive application of
CERCLA was proper25
D. Joint and Several Liability
Perhaps the most encompassing element of CERCLA liability is
87. See Retroactivity Prevails, Chem. Substances Control (BNA) No. 185, at 1 (Oct.
22, 1987); No Review of CERCLA Retroactivity, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1502 (Oct. 9,
1987).
88. S. BRIGGUM, supra note 58, at 21.
89. Appeals Court Rejects Lower Court Dismissal of Dispute over Indemnification
for Cleanup, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 681 (June 19, 1987) (discussing Marmon Group Inc. v.
Rexnord Inc., 822 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1987)).
90. 658 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
91. Id. at 278 n.3.
92. Under Superfund, It's "Let the Seller Beware," CHa Wx, June 17, 1987, at
46.
93. Sunnen Prods., 658 F. Supp. at 278 n.3.
94. Government Allowed to Sue Under CERCLA to Recover Pre-enactment Costs,
Court Says, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1539 (Jan. 9, 1987).
95. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,
734-37 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
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the imposition of joint and several liability." Although the statute does
not use the phrase "joint and several," courts uniformly have inter-
preted the statute to impose joint and several liability when the harm
is indivisible.9 7 Thus, the effects of CERCLA can be quite extensive.
For example, consider a situation in which waste materials from
dental fillings containing silver are sold to a firm that recovers the sil-
ver.98 The waste (mercury) from the silver recovery process is then de-
posited in local residential landfills. May the dentist be held liable?
The EPA thinks so.9 Certainly the fact that the material was sold
rather than taken as waste presents no barrier to liability. 00
1. Corporate Veil
CERCLA reaches directly through the corporate veil,1'0 though
not in the pure common law sense. 0 2 This enables the EPA simply to
96. Brennan, Joint and Several Liability for Generators Under Superfund: A Fed-
eral Formula for Cost Recovery, 5 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 101 (1986).
97. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 170 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D.
Ohio 1983). The Chem-Dyne court extensively explored the legislative history of CER-
CLA. In particular, the court addressed the question of why the term "joint and several"
was excised from the final version of the statute. The court determined that Congress
wished the courts to apply common law precepts of joint and several liability, thereby
making its imposition permissive rather than mandatory. The Chem-Dyne court con-
cluded that unless a defendant could show the harm caused was clearly divisible, the
imposition of joint and several liability was lroper. Id.
The Mansanto court adopted Chem-Dyne's analysis of CERCLA's legislative his-
tory. See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171 n.23. The court also noted that Congress tacitly
approved of the Chem-Dyne approach when adopting the SARA contribution provisions.
Id.
Hence, the rule today appears to be that among co-defendants, joint and several
liability will be presumed. Each defendant will have the burden of proving their respec-
tive, divisible contribution to the harm. Otherwise, they will be unable to escape the
imposition of joint and several liability.
98. The EPA has limited the reporting requirements for silver as a hazardous sub-
stance to an aggregate of pieces smaller than 100 micrometers weighing more than one
pound. 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1989).
99. See Where's the Novocaine?, Chem. Substances Control (BNA) 1 (Nov. 5,
1987).
100. CERCLA § 107(a)(3) imposes liability on those who contract to dispose of haz-
ardous wastes. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). This provision could implicate a dentist who sells
a waste product to a disposer of waste. Cf. New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp.
291, 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). But see United States v. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp.
842, 845 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (CERCLA does not impose liability for mere sale of a hazardous
substance)..
101. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) For the text
of section 107(a), see supra note 15.
102. Allen, Refining the Scope of CERCLA's Corporate Veil-Piercing Remedy, 6
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ignore the corporate veil or, in the alternative, to recognize the veil and
pierce it as provided for at common law.10 3 The message to industry is
simple: "'the typical corporate shield against liability of the past is not
good in a hazardous waste situation.' "101
The EPA will avoid the corporate veil to suit the following two
principal needs: (1) to reach and impose a duty on corporate managers
individually because of their power to control disposal of waste; and (2)
to reach parent corporations because of their potentially greater ability
to afford response costs.
a. Individuals
In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.
(NEPACCO I1)105 the federal district court for the western district of
Missouri held the president of a bankrupt corporation individually lia-
ble as an owner and operator.106 This result was somewhat surprising
since the president did not directly oversee activities at the remote site
from which the waste originated.
Although the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's finding of
liability, it did so on grounds unrelated to corporate veil-piercing, and
at least one commentator feels that imposition of "a duty to monitor
on corporate decision-makers may have been left intact. '10 7 New York
seems to concur.'08
Three cases decided subsequent to NEPACCO II have recognized
a statutory basis for corporate officer liability.'09 In the first of these
cases, United States v. Carolawn,1" 0 the federal district court in South
Carolina denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings by two corpo-
rate officers."' Similarly, in United States v. Mottolo"12 the federal
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 43 n.6 (1986-87).
103. See Comment, The Threat to Investment in the Hazardous Waste Industry:
An Analysis of Individual and Corporate Shareholder Liability Under CERCLA, 1987
UTAH L. Ruv. 585, 599.
104. Ryon, Toxic Waste Sites: Peril of Liability, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 10, 1985,
§ VII (Real Estate), at 1, col. 1 (quoting Stephen Ramsey).
105. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
106. Id. at 849.
107. Allen, supra note 102, at 70.
108. See New York Sues Bankrupt Company Officials for $15 Million over Ground-
water Contamination, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1425 (Dec. 19, 1986).
109. See Comment, Dissolving the Corporate Veil: Corporate Officer Liability for
Response Costs Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act, 17 U. TOL. L. REv. 923, 951 (1986).
110. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20699 (D.S.C. June 15, 1984).
111, See id. at 20700.
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district court of New Hampshire denied a motion for summary judg-
ment made by a corporate president, stating that individual liability
arose under CERCLA section 107(a)(3). 113 Finally, the Second Circuit
in New York v. Shore Realty Co.""4 held a corporate president liable as
an operator under CERCLA section 107(a)." 5
Because of CERCLA's language permitting the EPA to ignore the
corporate form, "[a]ll courts holding corporate officers individually lia-
ble have done so without piercing the corporate veil." 1116 Even in cases
in which a court seems convinced that the individual is more culpable
than the corporation, courts have found both liable, rather than resort
to common law piercing. For example, in United States v. Leigh In-
dustries"1 7 the federal district court in Colorado fined the defendant
corporation's president $10,000 while holding the corporation liable for
only $1.118 Individual liability, however, is not limited to corporate of-
ficers, since CERCLA permits it to be imposed on any employee. 19
b. Parent Corporations
The situation with respect to parent corporations seems even more
adhesive. The federal district court in Idaho applied the language from
NEPACCO 11 to find a parent corporation liable for the disposal prac-
tices of its subsidiary."20 This ruling makes acquisition of companies a
potentially dangerous endeavor. Furthermore, some courts have even
extended liability to corporations that have been dissolved. 1 '
112. 605 F. Supp. 898 (D.N.H. 1985).
113. Id. at 913-14.
114. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
115. See id. at 1052.
116. Comment, Corporate Officer Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal: What
Are the Consequences?, 38 MERCER L. Rav. 677, 686 (1987).
117. No. 87 CR 116 (D. Colo. Aug. 14, 1987).
118. Company President Sentenced, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1265 (Aug. 28, 1987).
119. See United States v. Carr, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21137 (2d Cir.
July 25, 1989) (maintenance foreman held individually liable).
120. See Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986) (Bunker
Hill I) ("Congress has determined that the persons who bore the fruits of hazardous
waste disposal also bear the costs of cleaning it up."); see also New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H.
1988); Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988). But see Joslyn Mfg. Co. v.
T. L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 681 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Utah
1987) (choosing not to follow Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 817
F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)).
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2. Insurers
Insurance companies are not actually subject to CERCLA liability,
but their policy holders are. Nonetheless, insurance companies feel the
pressure of CERCLA liability because the extent of policy coverage
may not be clear, especially for Comprehensive General Liability
(CGL) 122 policies.123 The insureds, companies the EPA has identified as
Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs), bring indemnification claims
to their insurers 12' to cover the costs of cleanup.
Since many of these policies were written before CERCLA, and
did not anticipate its absolute liability scheme, insurance companies
often litigate coverage.125 When the insurers lose, they are required to
cover a risk they did not anticipate and for which they did not bar-
gain.126 Even if an insurance company wins its coverage suit, the exten-
sive legal work required is quite costly.12 7 Because the stakes are
high, 2s no matter who prevails, the case generally will be appealed.
122. For a brief pertinent history of CGL policies, see Chesler, Rodburg & Smith,
Patterns of Judicial Interpretation of Insurance Coverage for Hazardous Waste Site
Liability, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 9, 14 (1986).
123. Discussion of insurer liability is somewhat abbreviated here since the topic is
adequately addressed by another Article in this symposium issue. See Monte, Insurance
Coverage for Superfund Claims: Are Response Costs Responsible Damages?, 41 S.C1.
REV. 871 (1990).
124. See Greenwald, UTC Sues 240 Insurers for Pollution Cover, Bus. INS., Feb. 1,
1988, at 27.
125. See Greenwald, Superfund Unleashes Flurry of Coverage Suits, Bus. INS., Feb.
1, 1988, at 1 (" 'It's become the national sport.'" (quoting Leslie Cheek, senior vice presi-
dent, Crum & Foster, Inc.)).
126. Ashley, Representation of the Insurer's Interests in an Environmental Dam-
age Claim, 54 DEF. CouNs. J. 11, 13 (1987) ("A review of the reported decisions involving
insurance coverage for environmental damage claims may lead to a certain pessimism
regarding the insurer's prospects for a successful coverage defense."). But see Greenwald,
supra note 124, at 27 ("Policyholders have not fared well in several recent coverage
decisions.").
127. See generally Kaplan, Balloun & Stigall, Defense Strategies and Insurance
Coverage Issues in a "Superfund" Case, 53 INS. COUNS. J. 554 (1986).
128. Adler, Appellate Court Denies Cover for Cleanup Costs, Bus. INS., Mar. 7,
1988, at 1, 100. As an example of high §takes, the federal government purchased the
town of Times Beach, Missouri for $33.7 million in 1983. Although liability litigation
concerning the dioxin manufacturer, Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co.
(NEPACCO), continues, the EPA has spent an additional $155,172 in cleanup costs.
Continental Insurance Company disputed NEPACCO's allegation that the CGL policy
applies. Id.; see also Marcus, The Price of Innocence: Landowner Liability Under CER-
CLA and SARA, 6 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TEcH. J. 117, 117 n.6 (1986) ("The average cost of
cleanup at a Superfund site during the years 1984-1985 was $12 to $13 million."). One
commentator suggests that "under SARA that figure may triple to $36 million." McMa-
hon, supra note 61, at 20.
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3. Successor Liability
a. Purchasers
Perhaps the most compelling criticism of CERCLA liability is the
assertion that it traps innocent purchasers. 129 Since courts have deter-
mined that CERCLA liability attaches to "those who own or operate a
facility at the time the release occurs,"130 an owner who purchased
without notice of prior contamination may nevertheless be a poten-
tially liable party. Under the joint and several liability scheme of CER-
CLA most "innocent landowners are considered just as culpable as the




When amending CERCLA in 1986, Congress addressed the inno-
cent purchaser dilemma. The statutory changes enacted by Congress
do not relieve the burden on innocent purchasers as much as they de-
tail how the burden attaches to these parties.1 3 2 The change that most
significantly affects innocent purchasers involves the definition of
"contractual relationship."13 3  The Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA) 13 allows purchasers to avoid CERCLA li-
ability if they purchase without knowledge of the land's condition, and
they make "all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and
uses of the property."13 Thus, SARA creates a requirement of environ-
mental "due diligence" in the purchase of property before relief from
CERCLA liability is possible. Commentators have indicated that the
activities necessary to manifest due diligence may be fairly exten-




129. Moskowitz & Hoyt, Enforcement of CERCLA Against Innocent Owners of
Property, 19 Loy. LA.L. REV. 1171, 1172 (1986) ("[C]ourts have disregarded traditional
notions of fairness in forcing those admittedly innocent of any polluting activities to pay
for extravagant cleanup costs.").
130. S. BRIGGUM, supra note 58, at 216.
131. Marcus, supra note 128, at 120.
132. "Congress probably took away more than it gave." Gaba, Lender Liability for
Hazardous Waste Cleanup, in LENDER LiABmirY LAw AND LnGATION § 12.03[2][b][i] (J.
Norton & M. Baggett eds. (Matthew Bender) 1989). For a review of the impact of SARA
on landowner liability, see Marcus, supra note 128, at 129.
133. See CERCLA § 101(35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
134. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1678 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
135. CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
136. E.g., Anderson, Will the Meek Even Want the Earth?, 38 MERCER L. REV. 535,
566 (1987) ("investigation almost certainly must entail at least a physical inspection of
the property").
137. See Leifer, EPA's Innocent Landowner Policy: A Practical Approach to Lia-
bility Under Superfund, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 646 (Aug. 4, 1989).
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By placing the burden on the purchaser, Congress has prevented
acceptance of activities like those of Donald LeoGrande which led to
the decision in New York v. Shore Realty Co. 13 In that case Le-
oGrande, a condominium developer and president of Shore Realty, had
the site audited prior to accepting a voidable purchase agreement. The
audit disclosed information indicating substantial environmental
problems. Nevertheless, LeoGrande opted not to void the purchase
agreement, but simply sought a waiver of liability on the grounds that
Shore Realty did not contribute to the problems at the site."39 The
court held Shore liable as an owner. 40 Notably, SARA's innocent pur-
chaser defense would not have affected this holding, since LeoGrande
knew of the land's condition.
b. Corporate Merger/Acquisition
While prudence may be an obvious requirement in the outright
purchase of industrial property, it may be overlooked in corporate
mergers or acquisitions. Because a firm acquires environmental liabili-
ties in most, if not all, acquisitions, "environmental risk is a vital factor
in corporate acquisitions."' 4' Some commentators feel liability may be
avoided "[b]y purchasing a company's assets rather than its stock.' 42
Others see liability attaching "regardless of whether the acquisition of
the property was through a stock transfer or a purchase of assets. 1 4 3
Given CERCLA's focus on ownership regardless of culpability, the lat-
ter view seems more likely. The result, however, ultimately may be de-
termined by state corporation law."
4
138. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) For a thorough analysis of the landmark Shore I
decision, see Note, New York v. Shore Realty, 27 NAT. RESOUCES J. 409 (1987).
139. See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1039.
140. Id. at 1044.
141. Varnum & Achterman, Toxic Waste Liability a Risk in Acquisitions, NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 15.
142. Buy Assets, Not Liabilities, Chem. Substances Control (BNA) 4 (Feb. 12,
1987). But see Spracker, Corporate and Liability Consequences of Acquiring Environ-
mentally Sensitive Properties in BURDENS OF ENVRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note
45, at 16 ("In a case now in litigation, United States v. Chemical and Pigment Co,. the
United States is for the first time attempting to establish a federal rule imposing liability
for CERCLA cleanup costs on successor corporations (those that acquire the assets of
another).").
143. Alden, Gloistein & Kroesche, Overview of General Laws that Govern Business
Decisions, in IMPA T OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS No. 286, supra note 81, at 261.
144. See Shea, supra note 66, at 13 (citing Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules Inc.,
762 F.2d 303 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985)).
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c. Foreclosure
In United States v. Mirabile145 Judge Newcomer squarely
addressed the issue of a foreclosing lender's liability. In that case two
banks and the Small Business Administration (SBA) foreclosed on the
Turco site in Phoenixville, Pennsylvania. 14 The court granted sum-
mary judgment to one of the banks and to the SBA on the grounds
that they did not fall within the statutory definition of either an owner
or operator.1
47
The remaining defendant, American Bank and Trust Company
(ABT), argued that its purchase of the site vested ABT only with equi-
table title. The court did not reach the equitable title argument, how-
ever, because it determined that ABT's actions fell within an exemp-
tion to ownership. That exemption permitted the holding of an
"indicia of ownership primarily to protect [a lender's] security inter-
est"'. 48 without being defined as an owner. 49
In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.'50 the federal
district court in Maryland reached the opposite conclusion under simi-
lar facts. While the Maryland Bank court noted distinguishing charac-
teristics,'1 ' it openly disagreed with a broad reading of Mirabile on the
issue of the foreclosure exemption.25 ' The Mirabile/Maryland Bank
controversy has become moot now, however, since CERCLA, as
amended by SARA, currently requires banks to meet the innocent pur-
chaser requirements to escape liability.' 5'
Nevertheless, Mirabile enjoys continued significance in two ways,
both of which involve the court's holdings concerning another bank,
Mellon. First, Mellon became involved in the case entirely through its
acquisition of yet another bank, Girard. Girard was the party which
had actually dealt with the Turco site. The fact that the transfer of
bank assets also meant a transfer of CERCLA liability understandably
145. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
146. Id. at 20995.
147. Id. at 20996-97.
148. Id. at 20995.
149. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
150. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
151. For example, ABT held the at-issue property for only 4 months, while Mary-
land Bank and Trust held the at-issue property for 4 years. Id. at 580.
152. Id.
153. Meeting the innocent purchaser requirements, however, is no simple feat:
"[A]lmost no one can qualify as an 'innocent landowner' or an 'innocent lender,' unless
and until they have gone through a complete environmental audit or assessment with
respect to their property or their loan security." Schwenke, An Overview of Issues of
Landowner and Lender Liability in BURDENS OF ENVmoNMETAL REGULATION, supra
note 45, at 13, 14.
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has the FDIC and FSLIC concerned. 154 Because of the increasing num-
ber of failing financial institutions, both of these agencies acquire bank
assets routinely-but neither wants the heavy extra baggage of CER-
CLA liability. In addition, lenders often resell loans in the federally-
operated secondary mortgage market. These loan-purchase agreements
contain environmental due diligence requirements. If the requirements
are not met, then the original lenders may have to repurchase the loans
secured by contaminated real estate.155
Second, the court in Mirabile declined to grant summary judg-
ment to Mellon because the facts concerning the level of Girard's in-
volvement in Turco's day-to-day operations were in dispute.56 An im-
permissible level of involvement would make the bank liable as an
operator of the site. In United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. 5 Judge
Kravitch indicated that day-to-day management by a lender is not re-
quired for the lender to incur liability. The court held "a secured credi-
tor may incur section 9607(a)(2) liability, without being an operator, by
participating in the financial management of a facility to a degree indi-
cating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous
wastes."1 59
Disallowance of bank involvement, however, arguably results in
the bank being unable to assure itself that its borrower can operate
effectively enough to repay its debt. Ironically, if the bank attempts to
avoid liability by not becoming involved in the borrower's business op-
erations, the bank increases the risk that foreclosure will be necessary,
and thus runs the risk that it will become subject to liability based on
foreclosure. The message lenders receive is simple:6 0 acquisition
154. See FDIC, FSLIC Face Liability for Cleaning Up Contaminated Properties
Held by Failed Banks, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1952 (Dec. 25, 1987).
155. Environmental Cleanup Liability Could Affect Mortgages, Lawyer Says, 19
Env't Rep, (BNA) 14 (May 6, 1988). (Loans which fail to meet Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation or Federal National Mortgage Association standards must be re-
purchased.). A copy of the Environmental Due Diligence Requirements of the Federal
National Mortgage Association is available in chapter 13, Appendix A of Gaba, supra
note 132.
156. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20997.
157. For a list of activities which may move a lender toward operator status, see
Gaba, supra note 132, § 13.02[1][c].
158. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
159. Id. at 1557 (footnote omitted).
160. See Breindel, The Hazards of Hazardous Waste, A.BA BANKING J., Oct. 1987,
at 169; Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of Intertem-
poral Creditor Priorities Created by Running Covenants, Products Liability, and Tax-
Waste Cleanup, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119 (1987); Fleischaker & Mitchell, The
Insecurities of Security Interests in Hazardous-Waste Cases, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 15, 1986,
at 18; Bank That Forecloses Liable for Waste Cleanup, LEGAL TnMEs, Apr. 28, 1986, at
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through foreclosure is ownership, which is liability, and too much in-
volvement, whether or not it constitutes operation, is still liability.
4. Governments
Although states are presumptively immune from suit in federal
court under the eleventh amendment, "[fliling suit as a plaintiff consti-
tutes a waiver of eleventh amendment immunity as well as sovereign
immunity."''11 Prior to the SARA amendments, a significant dispute
had developed concerning whether Congress had intended to abrogate
the eleventh amendment's protection of states in federal court.1
62
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit deter-
mined that SARA clearly stated congressional intent to abrogate elev-
enth amendment immunity. 63 The issue, however, still was not re-
solved completely. Judge Elfvin, in United States v. Freeman,'6'
questioned congressional authority to unilaterally abrogate eleventh
amendment immunity. 95 The Supreme Court finally resolved the issue
by reasoning that the Congress has the power under the commerce
clause to subject states to suits for damages.'
Even if eleventh amendment immunity is abrogated or waived,
SARA amended CERCLA to exclude from the definition of owner any
properties involuntarily acquired by a state or municipality. 67 The ex-
clusion is lost, however, if the state or local government contributed
hazardous substances to the site.'68 Thus, cities may find themselves




1. Statutes of Limitations
CERCLA provides for an express three-year limitations period.
70
161. United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 910 (D.N.H. 1985).
162. See United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1986) (Union Gas I),
vacated, 479 U.S. 1025 (1987).
163. United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987) (Union Gas II),
aff'd and remanded sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
164. 680 F. Supp. 73 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
165. Id. at 77.
166. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
167. See CERCLA § 101(20)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
168. Id.
169. See Court Rules Scranton, Pa., Liable at Site, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1744 (Nov.
13, 1987) (citing United States v. Scranton, Pa., No. 86-1591 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 1987)).
170. CERCLA § 112(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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But in United States v. Mottolo,'7 ' Chief Judge Devine ruled that
"Congress created a silent exception to CERCLA's three-year statute
of limitations by omitting any reference to judicial actions for cost re-
imbursement in section 112(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(d).."17 2 The court thus
determined that the three-year limitations period applied only to
claims against the Hazardous Substance Response Fund and judicial
actions for natural resource damage.'3
In United States v. Bliss (Bliss II)' 7, Judge Nangle indicated that
the defendants simply had failed to carry their burden of demonstrat-
ing the applicability of any statute of limitations. Accordingly, he
"summarily" denied their motion to dismiss the action. 17 5 In doing so,
Judge Nangle used language so terse that one might conclude that he
viewed the motion as bordering on frivolous.17 6 No court since has ap-
plied any statute of limitations to CERCLA judicial actions for cost
reimbursement.
2. Service of Process
Prior to the enactment of SARA, courts had held that CERCLA
authorized nationwide service of process.177 In United States v. Bliss
(Bliss' ),171 for example, Judge Nangle found that CERCLA section
106 "implies nationwide service of process.'. 7 9 This holding brought
defendant Syntex, the parent corporation of a Missouri corporation,
under the jurisdiction of the federal district court in Missouri, where
the disposal of the hazardous substances (Dioxin and Trichlorophenal
(TCP)) had occurred. Despite this and similar holdings permitting na-
tionwide service of process, the EPA requested and received from Con-
gress an explicit grant of nationwide service to reduce litigation
difficulties.18
When nationwide service of process is considered in light of: the
inclusiveness of the term "hazardous substance"; the loose require-
171. 605 F. Supp. 898 (D.N.H. 1985).
172. Id. at 903.
173. Id.
174. 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21217 (E.D. Mo. June 15, 1987).
175. Id.
176. Perhaps Judge Nangle's impatience can be explained by the fact that the de-
fendant, Bliss, represented himself pro se and clearly failed to plead his motion correctly.
177. See United States v. Bliss, 108 F.R.D. 127, 135 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (Bliss 1).
178. 108 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
179. Id. at 135.
180. See CERCLA § 113(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(e) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); see also
Note, Nationwide Service of Process Under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act: The Need for Effective Fairness Constraints,
73 VA. L. REV. 631, 632 (1987).
[Vol. 41
24
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss4/5
REDUCING THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ments for breach of duty and causation; the application and retroactive
application of absolute strict liability; and an expansive joint and sev-
eral liability scheme, then the truly pervasive and all-encompassing na-
ture of CERCLA liability is apparent.
III. COPING WITH CERCLA LIABILITY
Having discussed the tremendous burden CERCLA liability places
upon the various actors in the industrial property use and acquisition
system, the focus of the Article now turns to the reaction of these par-
ties to that burden.
A. Generators
Unquestionably CERCLA has been at least somewhat effective at
producing its desired results of cleaning up and preventing hazardous
waste contamination. This section of the Article suggests actions gener-
ators can take to prevent or reduce the probability of CERCLA liabil-
ity, as opposed to the ways to reduce retroactive cleanup costs.
1. Reductions in Use
On the prevention side, one of CERCLA's key effects has been the
minimization of hazardous waste production. For example, the Chemi-
cal Manufacturer's Association (CMA) reports that hazardous waste
generation by the chemical industry in this nation declined 21.8% dur-
ing the period 1981-85.181 Of course, "a major problem in evaluating
waste reduction trends is deciding exactly how it should be mea-
sured. ' ' 18 2 Nonetheless, these results and others indicate substantial
progress in the minimization of hazardous waste production, and
demonstrate that CERCLA does have significant positive impact.183
The question remains, however, whether that impact is enough.
Commentators charge that hazardous waste management practices re-
main disposal-oriented and "have failed to protect society adequately
181. Chemical Industry Cuts Hazardous Waste by More Than 20 Percent CMA
Study Says, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 571 (June 12, 1987).
182. Paige, Editorial, Focus (Newsletter of the North Carolina Solid and Hazardous
Waste Management Branch) 1 (Fall 1987).
183. See, e.g., Narus, Hazardous Wastes: Controlling Sources, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9,
1986, § 11 (New Jersey Weekly), at 1, col. 1 (Du Pont plant in Salem County, New Jersey
reduced its acid waste by 22% and organic chemical waste by 11% in the prior two
years); Chemical Firms Said Moving to Reduce Risk in General Absence of Pollution
Insurance, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 781 (Sept. 26, 1986); Rich, Waste Reduction is the Way
to Go, CHEM. Wi, Aug. 20, 1986, at 39.
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from the very substantial costs of hazardous waste production."'" It
generally is accepted that "the ultimate waste management technique
[is] source reduction."'15 The rational conclusion to be drawn from
these competing viewpoints implies that CERCLA liability is working,
but perhaps not precisely enough.
2. Control
Hazardous waste generators currently enjoy an increased level of
control over the disposition of their wastes. This increased control
manifests itself in four stages: transportation; method of disposal; au-
diting; and self-handling.
a. Transporters
At the transportation stage, generators have simply become suspi-
cious of their transporters. Prior to CERCLA, generators often viewed
waste collection as the end of their responsibility for the waste. Today,
generators know this is not the case. Even if the waste is purchased for
reuse188 or is transported to an unauthorized site-different from that
designated' 8 -- the generator may be held liable.
In addition to the liability imposed on the shipper,188 concern is
growing about the level of transporter quality. The Department of
Transportation's enforcement of the Hazardous Materials Transporta-
tion Act (HMTA) 8 9 also has been the target of criticism.190 Accord-
184. Note, Legal Incentives for Reduction, Reuse, and Recycling: A New Approach
to Hazardous Waste Management, 95 YALE L.J. 810 (1986).
185. Narus, supra note 183, at 1, col. 1.
186. See United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 893-94 (E.D.N.C. 1985) ("Liabil-
ity under CERCLA cannot be avoided by the mere characterization of a transaction as a
sale."); New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); United
States v. A&F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842, 848 (S.D. I1. 1984). But cf. Jersey City
Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., 655 F. Supp. 1257 (D.N.J. 1987) (court reluctantly
reached conclusion that sale of contaminated property followed by buyer's fortuitous
movement of waste to another location as fill material did not subject property seller to
liability at new location).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo.
1985) ("A generator is not absolved from liability under CERCLA simply because it did
not select the disposal site, [or] because ownership of waste was transferred to a
transporter.").
188. The "shipper" is the party who consigns the material to be shipped, as opposed
to the transporter or carrier who physically transports the material.
189. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1813 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
190. See Rich, Bluestone, Ichniowski & Bradford, Regulations, CHEM. WK, Aug. 20,
1986, at 49, 52 (attributing to Office of Technology Assessment).
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ingly, cautious selection of transporters has become more common."'
b. Destruction
One of the few requirements for liability under CERCLA is the
threat of release of a hazardous substance.192 Of course, destruction of
a hazardous substance prevents its release. Thus destruction represents
the ultimate form of control. 93 Therefore, generators of hazardous sub-
stances often seek to destroy their wastes as opposed to placing them
in landfills. "[L]andfills inhibit releases through containment but will
eventually (and usually gradually) leak and may contaminate ground-
water."19' Landfills give new meaning to the phrase "It]here is always a
way to water.'
9 5
Burying hazardous substances in landfills is appealing to industry
because of the relatively low cost as a means of disposal. The initial
cost of landfilling, however, does not reflect the true final cost after
CERCLA liability.-- Thus, sometimes apparent cost efficiency coaxes
generators into a disposal method that fails to reduce their liability
exposure.197 As liability information becomes better disseminated, how-
ever, the destruction option becomes more desirable and generators are
realizing that "it's prudent to incinerate when possible."'' 9
c. Auditing
The environmental audit is perhaps the most significant environ-
191. See generally Rosenberg, Coping with Hazardous Waste Disposal, EDITOR &
PUBLISHER, Dec. 5, 1987, at 46.
192. See CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
193. F. HERBERT, DUNE 422 (Berkley ed. 1977) ("The people who can destroy a
thing, they control it."). Dune, while transformed into a movie of dubious quality, was an
award-winning book, and certainly a classic in its genre. The book, written in 1965, was a
science fiction story set many millennia in the future, but it closely analogized and pre-
dicted the political and natural resources/environmental collision that occurred in the
1970s. In many ways its predictions concerning the conflicts over resources and the im-
portance of environmental awareness in politics have proven as prescient as Rachel Car-
son's Silent Spring.
194. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATE-
GIES FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL 14 n.2 (1983).
195. F. HERBERT, supra note 193, at 214.
196. See Rosenberg, supra note 191, at 46 ("bargain prices may only 'be a down
payment' on future financial liability for another's mismanagement" (quoting Ernest
King, ANPA industrial hygienist)).
197. Address by Senator Phil Leventis, University of South Carolina Environmental
Law Society (Feb. 13, 1988).
198. Rosenberg, supra note 191, at 52 (quoting Donald Anglehart, attorney with
Gadsby and Hannah, Boston).
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mental change industry has instituted. It has become the mainstay of
liability reduction. Initially, auditing met with resistance because "en-
vironmental audit studies entail risks that corporate executives may be
reluctant to undertake."'19 Eventually, however, the rationale prevailed
that "even dangerous facts are valuable if you've been trained to deal
with them. '20 Environmental audits initially developed with a self-as-
sessment focus in response to Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) requirements issued in 1971.21 But with the advent of CERCLA
liability, the audit report became "a valuable risk assessment docu-
ment. ' 20 2 Guidance documents explaining how to perform environmen-
tal audits20 3 and consultants willing to do SO 20 4 have become common
since CERCLA's enactment. While performance of self-assessments
25
may be propelled by all environmental statutes in combination, CER-
CLA alone propels auditing of disposal contractors.0 '
When an environmental audit is performed, it is important that
the auditor not overlook the financial stability of the contractor as a
factor. "'[M]ost disposal companies are involved in a corporate shell
game' ,,207 that can make financial assessment difficult. Thus, it is im-
portant "to look into the company's financial health.
'208
d. Self-Handling
While self-handling of waste materials would seem to afford com-
panies the greatest opportunity for control, it is not only a capital in-
tensive endeavor, but also requires acquisition of a RCRA part B per-
199. Myers & McCaffery, The Goals and Techniques of Environmental Audits, 30
PRAc LAW. 41, 52 (Jan. 15, 1984); see Hogan & Bromberg, The Hidden Hazards of the
Environmental Audit, 36 PRAC. LAW. 15 (April 1990).
200. F. HERBERT, supra note 193, at 43.
201. Securities Act Release No. 33-5170, 36 Fed. Reg. 13,989 (1971).
202. Myers & McCaffery, supra note 199, at 52.
203. See e.g., EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., ENVIRONMENTAL
AUDITING WORK3OOK (1983).
204. See, e.g., Three Steps to Compliance, Chem. Substances Control (BNA) 1
(Sept. 24, 1987).
205. Friedman & Gianotti, How to Perform an Environmental Self Assessment, 3
PRAC. REAL EST. LAW. 53 (Nov. 1987); Little, Environmental Self Assessments, 7 E. MIN.
L. INST. 2.1 (1986).
206. For good background analysis of liability for the eight major hazardous waste
disposal companies, see COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIorrIEs, HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGE-
MENT-REDUCING THE RISK (1986). But cf. Rich, Eight Companies on the Fast Track,
CHEM. W., Aug. 20, 1986, at 28.
207. Rosenberg, supra note 191, at 48 (quoting Donald Anglehart, attorney with
Gadsby and Hannah, Boston).
208. Id. at 46 (citing Ernest King, ANPA industrial hygenist).
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mit.2 0 9 In theory, the, part B permit should be available for any
company making the requisite application. As a practical matter, the
EPA permitting process is just beginning to move at a pace that would
make this a viable alternative.
2 10
B. Owners
The owner of a contaminated piece of property has three options
under CERCLA: two are bad; one is illegal. Under the first option, the
owner can spend substantial sums of money to clean up the site. The
owner then can spend more money to sue previous owners21' or other
PRPs212 for contribution. The owner must comply with the National
Contingency Plan (NCP) if contribution is sought. Among other things,
the NCP requires an opportunity for public hearing."'
The second option also requires the owner to spend significant
amounts of money on cleanup and legal costs, but the defendant is the
owner's insurance company." 4 If the owner loses, he basically is re-
stricted to option one.
The final option would be for the owner to misrepresent the status
of the property to an innocent purchaser, with substantially deeper
pockets, hoping that subsequent cleanup actions would be directed
against subsequent purchasers. CERCLA's criminal enforcement provi-
sions"' are not well developed and, thus, the owner may escape prose-
cution initially. Eventually, though, this option will lead to disasterous
results and the owner will go to jail.
2 16
209. See CERCLA § 125, 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
210. Rich, Bluestone, Ichniowski & Bradford, supra note 190, at 51 (of 2,909 appli-
cations since 1980, only 421 have been issued).
211. For an analysis of landowner suits, see Comment, Successor Landowner Suits
for Recovery of Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs: CERCLA Section 107(a)(4), 33 UCLA
L. Rav. 1737 (1986).
212. Haggerty, Environmental RM: "Bad News Game", NAT'L UNDERWRITER, July
4, 1986, at 4, 14 ("Eighty percent of the people who put substances in those landfills are
out of business." (citing Paul Fahrenthold, vice president, Extrix)).
213. See Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1574-82 (E.D. Pa.
1988). But see General Elec. Co. v. Litton Bus. Sys., 715 F. Supp. 949 (W.D. Mo. 1989)
(state agency input may substitute for public comment).
214. For a thorough analysis of causes of action against property insurers and their
defenses, see MALLIN, POLLUTION AND CONTAMINATION: How WILL PROPERTY INSURER'S
RESPOND? (1987).
215. CERCLA § 103(b)(3), (d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b)(3), (d)(2) (1982 & Supp. V
1987) (authorizing imposition of both fines and jail terms).
216. Hofman, Keep Up With Environmental Law: Expert, Bus. INs., Nov. 16, 1987,
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C. Purchasers
CERCLA and its state related progeny unquestionably have had a
substantial impact on the alienability of industrial property.217 A 1986
survey revealed that "environmental regulations regarding the disposal
of toxic wastes and the reuse, transfer and sale of industrial sites was
the foremost concern of corporate facility planners.""
Joint liability, as a practical matter, often leads to the result that
"the party responsible for the cleanup is usually the corporation with
the deepest pockets-the one with the most money."21 9 In order to di-
lute his own liability, all an owner with a "turkey piece of property"
220
really has to find is a buyer with deeper pockets.
While a seller is by no means absolved of responsibility, the buyer,
unlike the United States Attorney General, cannot compel the seller to
clean the property. Rather the buyer must clean it first and then risk
proving an action for damages.2
CERCLA liability has a way of creating desperation-and "des-
perate people are the most dangerous. '222 The buyer who believes the
days of caveat emptor have past will be rudely awakened. The viable,
albeit illegal, option for the owner who desires to avoid cleanup costs
will be to misrepresent the condition of the land, or withhold relevant
information. The unwary buyer will find that innocence combined with
ignorance will subject the otherwise faultless purchaser to CERCLA
liability.
223
Almost as dangerous as the fraudulent seller is the seller who has a
policy of letting "sleeping dogs lie. ' ' 224 The seller may think that by
remaining ignorant about the status of the property he can argue a
lack of culpability, but of course this argument does not diminish
CERCLA liability.
217. See Buckley, The Impact of Environmental Liability on Land Use Planning,
15 CAROLINA PLANNING 49 (Fall 1989).
218. The Impact of Environmental Considerations on Industrial Real Estate
Transactions, INDUS. Dav., Mar./Apr. 1986, at 1 (emphasis in original).
219. Baker, Contemporary Issues in Real Estate Transactions Involving Environ-
mental Concerns, INDUS. DEv., Mar./Apr. 1986, at 2.
220. Id. at 3.
221. Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20103 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 16, 1984).
222. F. HERBERT, supra note 193, at 450.
223. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
224. Stokes, Legal Aspects of Real Estate Transactions Involving Environmental
Concerns, INnus. DEv., Sept./Oct. 1986, at 10.
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1. Pre-Purchase Audit
The observation that "the unknown brings its own worries"
225
fairly summarizes the reasoning behind a pre-purchase audit. The pur-
pose of this type of audit centers on gathering information about the
property to be sold so that the parties involved, particularly the buyer,
know what is being transferred. The necessity of an environmental in-
spection prior to purchase of industrial property has been likened to
the termite inspection for home sales. 226 The failure to inspect may
result in "the ultimate nightmare for any company buying a piece of
land. 2 27 Therefore, pre-purchase audits are widely recommended.
228
225. F. HERBERT, supra note 193, at 387.
226. Paul, Environmental Exams Become Common, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1987, at 6,
col. 1.
227. Sheeran, Property Buyers Inspect Land for Toxic Waste, INC., Feb. 1986, at 97
(company which purchased property for $48,000 estimated cleanup bill at $2 million.).
228. See Paul, supra note 226, at 6, col. 1 (" 'You have to be an idiot not to look at
the [environmental] risks before buying a piece of property.'" (quoting Steven Tasher,
co-author of a handbook on environmental laws)); Payne, Pre-acquisition Site Audits
and Waste Cleanup, INDUs. Dsv., Sept./Oct. 1986, at 15 ("An environmental audit is an
indispensable part of property acquisition.").
One commentator recommends consideration of at least nine items when acquiring
property:
(1) disposal areas in and about the property;
(2) existing information concerning soil and groundwater;
(3) location of any underground storage tanks and lines;
(4) history of spillage or leakage;
(5) in-plant drainage systems and disposal facilities;
(6) historical information concerning disposal, loading and unloading areas, old
tankage, and information about conditions at the time of abandonment;
(7) location, use, and remaining contents of lagoons, impoundments, etc.;
(8) investigation for asbestos, PCB use (transformers, capacitors, etc.), or
ureaformaldehyde insulation; and
(9) examination of land for Radon.
Rodberg, General Environmental Law Considerations Affecting Business Transactions,
in IMPACT OF ENVIRONmENTAL REGULATIONS No. 286, supra note 81, at 52-53.
Note that that Radon, the substance cited in item 9 above, is directly addressed in
the Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2661-2671 (1988), and the "EPA is not
authorized... to provide for a removal or remedial action under CERCLA in response
to a release or threatened release of a naturally occurring substance." Gaba, supra note
132, § 13.02[l][b]. If, however, the source of Radon is augmented by normatural occur-
rences, CERCLA liability may lie. Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir.
1989). Regardless, Radon presents an interesting example of the pace with which envi-
ronmental concerns with property have grown since CERCLA's enactment. Consider the
following excerpts, in chronological order. Can You Make a House Too Tight?, CON-
SUtER REP., Oct. 1981, at 582 (While recognizing Radon as a potential threat, Con-
sumer's Union concluded "it would be extremely difficult to tighten most existing houses
enough to create an indoor air problem."); Indoor Air Pollution, CONSUMER REP., Oct.
1985, at 600, 601 ("Increasing evidence suggests that the second leading cause of lung
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Of course, auditing a site costs money, but failing to audit an ex-
isting industrial facility can cost a great deal more.22 As a result, CER-
CLA has created a virtual requirement for environmental auditing,
which is a significant additional burden on the purchaser of industrial
property. Adding further cost to the risk reduction, it is imperative
that both parties consider the confidentiality of the audit results. The
only way to ensure reasonable confidentiality is to invoke the attorney-
client privilege, which obviously adds to the expense.2 ' Moreover, the
attorney who engages an environmental consultant to perform an audit
for a client must be sure that the consultant is competent.
231
Finally, purchasers through corporate acquisition or merger should
be just as careful as those who simply purchase real property.22
2. Contract Provisions
One way to limit the expense and hassle of environmental audits is
to include a remedies provision in the purchase contract. In fact,
cancer may well be exposure to radon gas."); Radon Detectors, CONSUMER REP., July
1987, at 440, 443 ("CU strongly urges that all homes be screened for radon. (A radon test
would also be a wise requirement to write into a home-buying contract, along with a
clause requiring the seller to fix any problems.)" (emphasis in original)); Kornreich,
Dealing with the Invisible Trap of Radon Liability, PRAc. REAL EST. LAw., Sept. 1987, at
17, 18 ("Lawyers have only begun to glimpse the radon-related liability problems likely
to arise as awareness and fear spread to the general public."); Hebert, Dangerous Levels
of Radon Widespread, Washington Post, Oct. 19, 1989, at A28, col. 1.
In addition to the nine items listed above, another commentator suggests considera-
tion of the following factors when acquiring property:
(1) legal chain of ownership and control (including chain of leases);
(2) employee complaints; and
(3) neighbors/local citizens' groups.
Miller, The Components of a Facility Review, INDUS. DEV., Mar./Apr. 1986, at 4.
229. Payne, supra note 228, at 17. A parcel with 12 buildings on it was sold for
about $2.5 million. Engineering studies several years later indicate the buyer also pur-
chased $6 million to $10 million in chemical cleanup costs: no bargain at half the.price.
Id.
230. For a consideration of factors to consider in maintaining attorney-client confi-
dentiality in this context, see Witmer, Environmental Audits in Connection with Prop-
erty Purchases and Sales, in IMPACT oF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS No. 286, supra
note 81, at 292.
231. An attorney should consider an environmental consultant's reputation, but pro-
fessional registration (Professional Engineer, for example) and substantial malpractice
insurance are equally important. CERCLA is not simply a boon for attorneys, it has
attracted many environmental "specialists," some of dubious quality. A prudent attorney
will work hard to protect the client from receiving poor advice.
232. See generally, Koczan, Environmental Audits and Their Application to Real
Property Transfers, Acquisitions and Divestitures, in IMPACT OF ENVIRONmENTAL REGU-
LA'IONS No. 286, supra note 81, at 271; see also Information Should be Gathered, 17
Env't Rep. (BNA) 792 (Sept. 26, 1986).
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whether or not an audit is performed, protective provisions in the
purchase contract always should be considered. Both audits and reme-
dies provisions have become integral parts of industrial real estate
purchases. The buyer can protect himself from the risk of unquantifi-
able CERCLA liability in three ways: (1) by including a provision
coupling a pre-purchase audit with termination rights; (2) by having
the seller make specific representations, warranties and indemnities in
the contract; or (3) by having the seller agree to perform necessary re-
medial work.233
While this may seem relatively simple, "environmental provisions
have become one of the most hotly contested issues in real estate nego-
tiations. '23 4 Not surprisingly, the more likely that the provisions will
be utilized, the more time and effort the parties will spend scrutinizing
them. Since existing industrial sites involve numerous environmental
risks, environmental provisions in contracts concerning these sites are
the ones most likely to be needed-and thus, most difficult to acquire
and, even if acquired, most likely to be litigated.
The details of these provisions can have tremendous impact on the
allocation of risk. Therefore, contractual clarity is vital. To reduce the
possibility of misinterpretation, commentators have developed stan-
dard contract forms.235 Clearly, CERCLA has created a reaction in pur-
chasers that manifests itself in additional and expensive contractual
gyrations.
3. Foreign Industrial Sites
For some companies a viable option to CERCLA liability is to lo-
cate industrial facilities outside the United States. The advantage of
this option is that South America, Central America, and Canada have
less restrictive environmental laws.236 Some commentators have linked
CERCLA liability to the migration of companies out of the United
States.
23 7
Canada is especially attractive to some industrial decision makers,
because it is socio-economically comparable to the United States, and
some portions of Ontario are actually more centrally located to north-
233. Chesler, Negotiating the Environmental Issues in Real Estate Contracts, IN-
DUS. DE v., May/June 1987, at 19, 26.
234. Id. at 19.
235. See Chesler, Environmental Provisions in Real Estate Contracts, in IMPACT OF
ENIRONmENTAL REGULATIONS No. 286, supra note 81, at 311, 333-49.
236. P. SHRIVASTAVA, BHOPAL: ANATOMY OF A CRISIS (1987).
237. Industry Shut Out of Superfund Agreement Attorney Says; Corporate Risks
Discussed, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 780 (Sept. 26, 1986) (citing an address by George Free-
man, lawyer with Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Va.).
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eastern population centers. Canada's moderate environmental regula-
tions have not imposed liability on the scale that CERCLA has, but
companies should be wary that it someday might, and purchase with
appropriate caution."'
4. Virgin Property
Just as CERCLA liability can induce companies to locate facilities
outside the United States, it also can induce them to prefer undevel-
oped property within the United States. The benefits of purchasing
undeveloped property as opposed to existing industrial property are
obvious. The comparison will be discussed in further detail in a later
section of this Article,2 3  but suffice it to say at this juncture that
nondeveloped property is not always as pristine as it appears.
D. Lenders
Lenders face a Catch-22 situation: they cannot afford to lend
money to industry without attempting to assure their loan does not go
bad, but they cannot risk becoming too involved in the borrower's bus-
iness. In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.24 0 the court
specifically noted that banks were in a position to oversee the practices
of their borrowers. For a bank to become involved in the borrower's
affairs, however, would be "suicidal in this hey day of lender liabil-
ity." 24 1 This was made quite clear in United States v. Mirabile14 2 Con-
sequently, "[p]rogressive financial institutions are expanding the meth-
ods they use to identify high-risk companies,' 2 3 but identifying the




Pre-loan audits provide the lender with an opportunity to appraise
238. See Handley, Exports of Waste from the United States to Canada: The How
and Why, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10061 (Feb. 1990).
239. See infra pp. 807-12.
240. 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md. 1986).
241. Address by Professor Philip Lacy, University of South Carolina (Mar. 22,
1988).
242. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20997 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
243. Murphy, Environmental Risks Pose Hidden Liabilities, AB.A. BAMNO J.,
Apr. 1986, at 96.
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the borrower's existing CERCLA liability risk potential, but it does not
assess future liability potential. Nevertheless it is highly recom-
mended.24 5 Many executives of borrower companies have the "errone-
ous belief that their companies have no hazardous waste problems.
'2 6
An audit can prove or disprove that belief and allow the company to
address concerns it may not have recognized otherwise. Once compa-
nies appreciate their risk of CERCLA liability, they can take steps to
reduce the risk of exposure, thus making it less likely that lenders will
be left in an unsecure position. In addition, a pre-loan environmental
audit might actually identify environmental concerns serious enough to
jeopardize the granting of the loan. In these cases, the bank makes a
very sound investment in the audit indeed.
For the two reasons described above, borrower informing and bor-
rower selecting, banks have entered the environmental audit arena
with unprecedented force, resulting in "a dramatic rise in private in-
spections. ' '247 For example, Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. (CB&T) re-
quires, among other investigations, that the prospective borrower
"agree to commission soil tests. '248 The cost of these audits transfers to
the borrower either directly (as with CB&T) or indirectly (through
higher interest rates). In any case, the pre-loan "environmental audit
will have to become the lender's most trusted tool.
249
2. Continuing Audits
The continuing audit or, more descriptively, the periodic unan-
nounced audit, has the advantage of keeping the lender informed of
the activities of the borrower. This permits the lender to assess his
current risk as opposed to the risk encountered at the time of the loan.
It may also affect the borrower's environmental activities, simply by
forcing him to periodically focus on the environmental compliance
issue.
The concern with continuing audits rests on their use. If the
lender uses the audit to suggest ways the borrower might better reduce
liability, then the lender has possibly intruded into the operational
245. Van Lieshout, Breaking the Bank: Liability Under Superfund, 16 REAL EST.
REv., Fall, 1986, 51, 55.
246. Shea, supra note 66, at 14.
247. Real Estate Transfers. . ., Chem. Substances Control (BNA) 3 (Aug. 27, 1987)
("Last year alone, private inspections outnumbered public inspections made by state of-
ficials during the previous decade.").
248. Steptoe, Chemical Waste Complicates Many Land Sales, Financings, Wall St.
J., Nov. 5, 1986, at 39, col. 1.
249. Van Lieshout, supra note 245, at 54.
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management of the borrower's activities.5 0 Such intrusion subjects the
lender to joint and several liability for the borrower's CERCLA liabil-
ity.251 For most banks, this would be unacceptable.
Independent auditors, required by the lender but paid for by the
borrower, have been suggested by some commentators as an alternative
to this dilemma. 52 Whether recommendations by these auditors could
be construed as an intrusion by the lender into the operational man-
agement of the borrower is an open question.
53
3. Pre-Foreclosure Audits
Banks dealing with industrial borrowers have developed a compro-
mise known as the pre-foreclosure audit. While it prevents attachment
of CERCLA liability due to operational involvement, it risks abandon-
ment of the lender's security interest. The bank does not know if it has
any collateral until the borrower is in default. Although abandonment
of the security interest may be undesirable, the lender's interest is in
even greater jeopardy if it purchases environmentally impaired prop-
erty at a foreclosure.
4. Refusal
Some commentators have noted that a bank's first reaction to
CERCLA liability "is to restrict loans made to industries perceived as
subject to environmental risk. 2 5 4 Others.implicitly support this ap-
proach, noting that "[i]t is no coincidence that environmentally related
bankruptcies are becoming common. 25 5 CERCLA liability is having a
chilling impact for those trying to obtain industrial development
loans.2 6 In some cases, lenders simply have avoided taking a security
250. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
251, Mannino, Don't Poison Your Portfolio with Toxic Waste, A.BA BANKING J.,
Aug. 1987, at 83 ("Lenders should avoid getting entangled in the daily operations of any
borrower."); O'Brien, Hazardous Waste Can Create a Legal Mess for Lenders, BoTtoM-
LINE, Sept. 1987, at 75, 76 ("If a lender becomes involved in the day-to-day operation
and management of a site, it is potentially liable for the entire cost of cleanup.").
252. Shumate, supra note 7, at 46 ("The lender's best protection is thorough, peri-
odic environmental audits conducted by a competent independent auditor.").
253. For a list of ten particularly dangerous lender actions, see Mannino, supra note
251, at 83.
264. Shea, supra note 66, at 13.
256. Klotz & Siakotos, Lender Liability Under Federal and State Environmental
Law: Of Deep Pockets, Debt Defeat and Deadbeats, 92 CoM. L.J. 275, 295 (1987).
256. Potential Waste Cleanup Liability May Turn Bankers Against Industrial De-
velopment Loans, METALs WK., May 5, 1986, at 3.
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interest and have relied on the principals "to give personal guarantees
for the amount of the loan.
257
5. Insurance
Environmental impairment liability (EIL) insurance is becoming
increasingly desirable. 258 In fact, some banks may require it prior to
granting a loan. Banks should be aware, however, that in the current
insurance market such a requirement is effectively a refusal to make
loan.
E. Insurers
Insurers have taken three basic approaches to reduce their envi-
ronmental losses. First, they frequently are refusing to insure any envi-
ronmental damage or loss.25 9 Second, even when they do agree to some
form of environmental insurance, it is limited in scope, usually cover-
ing only sudden occurrences. 6 0 Third, they are auditing their policy-
holders to assure the risk is minimized.
261
1. Refusal
It is clear that environmental liability insurance is practically non-
existent.6 2 What little does exist263 is mostly accidental, and insurers
are working to seal up those accidental loopholes. 2 14 What may seem
surprising is the number of years the insurance industry has been una-
ble to compensate for this void.265 The General Accounting Office
257. Larsen & Boman, Environmental Liability: Lender and Landlord Tenant Is-
sues, in IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENTAL REGULAONS No. 286, supra note 81, at 279.
258. See Shumate, supra note 7, at 46.
259. See infra notes 262-66 and accompanying text.
260. See infra notes 267-69 and accompany'mig text.
261. See infra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
262. Pollution Insurance: A Financial Responsibility Gap, Chem. Substances Con-
trol (BNA) 3 (Nov. 5, 1987); Lack of Pollution Insurance Described, 17 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 781 (Sept. 26, 1986); Environmental Insurance Called "Nightmare": Blame At-
tributed to Litigation, Superfund Law, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 791 (Sept. 26, 1986). The
EPA recently extended the compliance date for financial assurance obligations for un-
derground storage tank owners, primarily due to the difficulty in acquiring insurance. 55
Fed. Reg. 18,566 (May 2, 1990).
263. Most Hazardous Waste Firms Operating Without Insurance, GAO Finds, IN-
SIDE EPA (Inside Washington), Nov. 6, 1987, at 13 (only one carrier, the American Inter-
national Group, is pursuing the environmental impairment liability insurance market).
264. Aldred, Property Insurers to Reword Pollution Exclusion, Bus. INs., Feb. 29,
1988, at 28.
265. Bailey, Working Together to Clean Up America, INDUS. Wv., June 10, 1985, at
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(GAO), however, recently released a report which provides an explana-
tion. It asserts that environmental impairment liability insurance is so
difficult to find because "[w]aste sites are inevitably going to leak,
which is not a 'fortuitous, insurable event.' "266
2. Limited Scope
Several companies have begun to offer limited environmental in-
surance.2 17 Most of these policies limit the scope of the insurance to
"sudden and accidental" events, specifically excluding long-term grad-
ual environmental impairment.268 Even when risk retention groups can
be established to cover some environmental impairment liability, vast
areas remain excluded.26 9
Such policies invariably require the potential policyholder "to ob-
tain an independent risk assessment of each site. ' '270 These initial re-
views can be quite extensive, and they will determine whether or not
insurance coverage will be made available to the potential policy-
holder.271 These reviews are considered so important, even some title




State governments are reacting to CERCLA liability in a number
of ways. One way is the development of legislation similar to New
Jersey's 1983 Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA)
27 3
14 (identifying an "insurance 'capacity crunch' "); Diamond, Insurance Against Pollu-
tion Is Cut, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 6 ("nearly all major insurers have
decided to reduce or eliminate pollution policies").
266. GAO Finds Lack of Insurance Carriers for Hazardous Waste Handlers, Facili-
ties, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1580 (Oct. 23, 1987) (quoting General Accounting Office, Haz-
ardous Waste: Issues Surrounding Insurance Availability (GAO/RECD-88-2) (1987)).
267. Coverage for Some, Chem. Substances Control (BNA) 2 (Nov. 19, 1987);
United Coastal Insurance Co. Offers Policy to Cover Hazardous Waste Storage Liabili-
ties, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1630 (Oct. 30, 1987).
268. Insurance Coverage for "Sudden" Pollution Excludes Long-term Incidents,
Court Decides, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1108 (Aug. 21, 1987).
269. Finlayson, A&A Drums Up Interest in EIL Facility, Bus. INS., Feb. 2, 1987, at
6 (policy excludes acid rain, radon, asbestos, earthquakes, nuclear fuel, and underground
storage tanks).
270. Id.
271. Dwyer, Impairment Liability Insurance-Does Your Facility Make the
Grade?, EuVT & WASTE MGMT. WORLD, Oct. 1987, at 7.
272. See Murphy, supra note 243, at 97.
273. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-6 to -14 (West Supp. 1989).
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Connecticut has passed similar legislation,7 4 and at least 22 states
have proposed legislation.
Basically, ECRA sets up a scheme in which the transferor of in-
dustrial property must file with the New Jersey Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection (NJDEP), 60 days prior to transfer of property,
either (1) a site cleanup plan or (2) a "negative declaration." A nega-
tive declaration is simply an affidavit certifying that the property is
free of environmental impairment. If the declaration proves false or
any other noncompliance with ECRA is found, the transferee or
NJDEP may void the transfer. Furthermore, the transferor becomes
strictly liable for cleanup costs and is subject to $25,000 per day in
fines. The thrust of the statute is to avoid innocent purchaser liability,
but "the cure may be as bad as the disease. 27 6
Some of the problems created by ECRA277 and faced by companies
in New Jersey result from the fact that "transfer" includes (1) sale of
stock, (2) sale of controlling share of the assets, (3) conveyance of real
property (by deed or mortgage foreclosure), (4) dissolution of corporate
identity, (5) financial reorganization, or (6) initiation of bankruptcy.
Failure to properly complete the ECRA requirements allows the
NJDEP to void the sale, potentially frustrating the desires of all par-
ties involved. Even following the letter of the law can frustrate a sale
since delays of "several months ''27s have not been uncommon and "no
amount of pre-transactional planning will ensure that ECRA approvals
can be obtained quickly."
27 9
Some companies have charged that ECRA is an unconstitutional
interference with federal security laws regarding tender offer, but these
companies have failed to persuade the federal district court of New
Jersey.2 80 Undoubtedly, New Jersey's inclusion of stock transfers in the
ECRA statute was prompted by the fact that such transactions can
lead to CERCLA liability for unsuspecting parties.
The problems presented by ECRA with regard to real estate trans-
fers has eased recently in New Jersey, partly through a change in ad-
274. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-134 to -134d (West Supp. 1990) ("Transfer Act").
275. Mulcahy, supra note 6, at 5. For a comparison of the proposed statutes and
bills, see Weisman, The Implications of Environmental Law on Business Transactions;
New Trends, in IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS No. 286, supra note 81, at 9, 19-
26.
276. Shumate, supra note 7, at 45.
277. For a concise summary of ECRA, see Nucciarone, ECRA: Its Provisions, in IM-
PACT OF ENviRONMENTAL REGULATIONS No. 286, supra note 81, at 29.
278. Id. at 33.
279. Id. at 35.
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ministrative priorities. The successes of the Act, however, are unlikely
to diminish.
2. Notice Requirements
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)28s requires
owners of property used as a Hazardous Waste Disposal Facility to rec-
ord that information in the deed.28 2 Several states have expanded this
rule by requiring the seller to provide notice to the buyer of environ-
mental impairments in any property. Unlike ECRA, however, the rules
usually do not require any certification with a state agency and they do
not necessarily provide for voiding of the transfer. Failure to provide
the information is a misrepresentation, however, entitling the pur-
chaser to the associated remedies.283
3. Superliens
At least six states, Arkansas, 284 Connecticut,
286 Massachusetts, 2B6
New Hampshire,28 7 New Jersey 8 s and Tennessee 28 have enacted
superlien provisions,2s° and Minnesota has considered a superlien
bill.2 0 1 A superlien gives the state "first-priority lien against property
subject to a cleanup," 292 regardless of any security interests filed prior
to the state's lien. In most cases the cost of cleanup exceeds the value
of the property, so mortgage liens are effectively erased.293
281. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
282. See 40 C.F.R. § 264.119(b)(1) (1989).
283. See Dean, How Hazardous Waste Statutes Influence Real Estate Transac-
tions, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 933, 934 (July 31, 1987) (comparing the laws of Massachu-
setts, MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 21c, § 7 (West 1981 & Supp. 1990); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 115B.16 (West 1987); Pennsylvania, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6018.405,
.601-.607 (Purdon Supp. 1989); and West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 20-5E-20 (Michie
1989)); see also Stever, ECRA and Other Restrictions on the Transfer of Hazardous
Waste Sites, in IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS No. 316, supra note 33, at 149,
152.
284. ARM STAT. ANN. §§ 8-7-417, -514, -516 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1989).
285. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a (West Supp. 1990).
286. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E, § 13 (West Supp. 1990).
287. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b (Equity Supp. 1989).
288. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.llf(f) (West Supp. 1989).
289. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-209 (Michie Supp. 1989).
290. See Cohen, Hazardous Waste: A Threat to the Lender's Environment, 19
U.C.C, L.J. 99, 115.23 (1986) (reviewing 11 state superlien statutes).
291. Attorney General Proposes State Liens for Those Who Cannot Repay
Cleanup Costs, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1936 (Dec. 18, 1987).
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Superliens are established, in part, to offset CERCLA's require-
ment of state contribution (minimum ten percent) to the cleanup costs
within its borders.294 The superlien permits states to recover (some-
times) part of the cost from the sale of the cleaned property, but it
does so at the expense of any other lien holder. The states which react
to superfund with a superlien provision do so in an effort to shift the
burden onto another party. In this case, the recipients of the burden
(usually banks) perceive this as another hazard to hazard lending.
Superliens augment an already substantial justification to treat indus-
trial loans with suspicion.
Even without superliens, if a bankruptcy"15 petition is filed, states
may be successful in recovering cleanup costs2 6 as administrative ex-
penses.297 In Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prod-
ucts Co.)299 the Sixth Circuit held "it proper that the response costs
incurred by Tennessee and recoverable under CERCLA be deemed an
administrative expense. '29 9 In reversing the district court's affirmance
of the bankruptcy court's decision, Judge Keith relied on the Supreme
Court's rationale in Ohio v. Kovacs 300 and Midlantic National Bank v.
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.30 1
Based on his reading of Kovacs, Judge Keith determined that the
bankruptcy trustee had a duty to "'comply with the environmental
laws of the State.' "302 Citing Midlantic, he found that" 'the efforts of
the trustee to marshal and distribute the assets of the estate must
yield to governmental interest in public health and safety.' "1303 As
might be expected, these rulings have sent reverberations of concern
throughout the creditor community.30 " Likewise, the legal community
has latched onto the conflict between bankruptcy and environmental
294. See CERCLA § 104(c)(3)(C)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3)(C)(ii) (1982 & Supp. V
1987).
295. For a brief discussion of the nonbankruptcy, nonsuperlien situation, see Baird,
Environmental Regulation, Bankruptcy Law, and the Problem of Limited Liability, in
BURDENS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 45, at 4, 5.
296. For a breakdown of sample cleanup costs, see Gaba, supra note 132, at 13-65,
app. E.
297. Lancaster v. Tennessee (In Re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118
(6th Cir. 1987).
298. 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987).
299. Id. at 123.
300. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
301. 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
302. Wall Tube, 831 F.2d at 122 (quoting Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285) (emphasis in
Wall Tube).
303. Id. at 121-22 (quoting Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 502) (emphasis in Wall Tube).
304. Sixth Circuit Gives Tennessee Priority in Claim for Costs from Bankrupt
Company, 18 ENV'T RaP. (BNA) 1574 (Oct. 23, 1987); Tennessee: Priority Creditor,
Chem. Substances Control (BNA) 3 (Nov. 5, 1987).
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law0 5 with a synergetic fervor that outpaces even the rapid growth of
these two areas of law in the past decade.306
G. Local Governments
Local government reaction generally has been subdued-but it
certainly exists. Purchasers of industrial property, especially in urban
areas, should be sure to check for local regulations. At least two local
governments, San Francisco, California 307 and Dade County, Florida,305
have considered real estate transaction ordinances.
H. Federal Government
Perhaps the most telling reaction to CERCLA liability by the fed-
eral government can be found in CERCLA's amendments. The
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA),309 known in
some circles as "Hurricane SARA," 310 reaffirms the CERCLA liability
scheme virtually in its entirety. SARA's impact generally extends,31'
305. Schwenke, Welcome, in BURDENS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note
45, at 1 ("Bankruptcy law, the cleanup of hazardous waste sites, and secured creditors'
rights have come into increasing conflict.").
306. See, e.g., Cosetti & Friedman, Midlantic National Bank, Kovacs, and Penn
Terra: The Bankruptcy Code and State Environmental Law-Perceived Conflicts and
Options for the Trustee and State Environmental Agencies, 7 J.L. & Com. 65 (1987);
Shanker, A Bankruptcy Superfund for Some Super Creditors, 61 AM. BANKE. L.J. 185
(1987); Note, Bankruptcy Trustee's Abandonment of Burdensome Estate Property and
State Environmental Protection Laws: Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Depart-
ment of Envionmental Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986), 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 853 (1987);
Note, Bankruptcy: Restrictions on Abandonment of Burdensome Property-Midlantic
National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 20 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 165 (1986).
307. See San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 253-86 (June 9, 1986).
308. Proposed rule published in Earl, Local Government's Role in Hazardous
Waste-Can Traditional Zoning Police Power Now Extend to the Boardroom and to
the Closing Table?, in BURDENS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 45, at 33, 35.
309. For a thorough, but easy to pinpoint, analysis of the effect of SARA provisions
on CERCLA, see Brown, Harris & Dudley, A Side by Side Comparison of Liability Pro-
visions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, the House and Senate Versions of the 1986 Superfund Reauthorization
Legislation and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, in
SUPERFIUND: THE 1986 AMENDMENTS (Practicing Law Institute Litigation and Administra-
tive Practice No. 315) 357 (Brown ch. 1986).
310. See Bayko & Share, Stormy Weather on Superfund Front Forecast as "Hurri-
cane SARA" Hits, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 24.
311. For example, SARA provided nationwide service of process and clear language
of intent to abrogate states' eleventh amendment immunity to suit in federal court.
Brown, Harris & Dudley, supra note 309, at 45.
42
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss4/5
REDUCING THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
rather than inhibits,312 CERCLA liability.
While Congress continues the CERCLA rampage, the EPA has de-
veloped a scheme for releasing PRPs from liability-for a price.31
These so-called "covenants not to sue" permit the EPA to settle cases
with certain PRPs without commencing litigation.31 4 The covenant,
however, is effective as to only certain PRPs and the EPA preserves its
cause of action against others. The EPA has tremendous leverage in
negotiating the covenants and they invariably have reopener clauses
that permit the EPA to charge additional costs should costs at the sites
exceed the EPA's preliminary estimates.315 Nevertheless, some PRPs
like the cash out method because it allows them to resolve the problem
quickly.
Even the federal government is beginning to scrutinize closely its
own property transfers: the EPA has been reviewing a draft of pro-
posed regulations. 16 Likewise, local governments are being encouraged
"to follow the example of private industry and start auditing the envi-
ronmental sta[t]us of the property before they foreclose or buy.
'317
IV. IMPACT OF CERCLA BURDENS ON SITE SELECTION
This section of the Article focuses on CERCLA burdens as they
affect the advantages of purchasing nonindustrial property rather than
existing industrial property. This analysis proceeds from the reactions
of the various parties previously discussed.
A. Existing Industrial Property Versus Virgin Property
The respective advantages of existing industrial property and non-
industrial property can be broken into three parts. The first part in-
volves the purchase or acquisition itself. The second and third parts
312. One of the few liability inhibiting provisions in SARA provided a negligence
standard of liability for engineering contractors who clean up existing Superfund sites.
Id. at 61.
313. EPA "Covenant Not to Sue" May Shelter PRPs From Liability, SUPERFUND
REPORT (Inside Washington) 1 (June 10, 1987).
314. Even the courts are supportive of the EPA's efforts to reduce litigation by en-
couraging covenants not to sue. See United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d
497 (7th Cir. 1986)
315. See supra text accompanying note 37.
316. See Federal Facility-Property Transfers, SUPERPUND REPORT (Inside Washing-
ton) 4 (June 10, 1987); see also Reporting Hazardous Substance Activity When Selling or
Transferring Federal Real Property, 55 Fed. Reg. 14,208 (Apr. 16, 1990).
317. Steinzor, Local Governments and Superfund: Deciding Just Who Will Pay the
Tab, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 16, 1987, at 22.
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Whether the property is an existing industrial site or apparently
virgin land, the purchaser faces an unknown environmental liability
risk. 318 The likelihood that the risk will be substantial seems greater if
the location has hosted prior industrial activity. In any case, the cost of
surveying an industrial facility for environmental impairment far ex-
ceeds the cost of uncovering any activities on apparently virgin soil.
Hence, the least expensive means of reducing the risk today is develop-
ment of virgin land.
b. Potential for Misrepresentation
As noted earlier, an owner who knows of hazards or potential
hazards, may be inclined to sell contaminated property to a buyer with
deeper pockets.3 19 And while brokers have been held liable under a
negligence standard,320 they still have an incentive for downplaying the
negative aspects of a property purchase.32 1 The potential for misrepre-
sentation lurks behind any transaction, but the probability of it surfac-
ing after the purchase is much greater with existing industrial property
than with virgin land. Certainly the failure of any attorney involved in
a real estate transaction to alert his client to the potential for environ-
mental liability could be construed as malpractice.
c. Transaction Costs and Delays
While transaction costs and delays for audits of industrial facilities
may be expected, ECRA-type statutes can create additional delays. In
some cases these delays may be substantial enough to justify selection
318. Note, Hazardous Waste and the Innocent Purchaser, 38 U. FLA. L. REv. 253,
254 (1986) ("Even the most prudent purchasers cannot confidently acquire property free
of potential hazardous waste liability.").
319. See supra notes 216, 222-23 and accompanying text.
320. See Ryon, supra note 104, at 6.
321. See Ewing, Recycling a Tainted Ohio Tract, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1987, § 8, at
1, col. 1 (comparing two North Carolina brokers handling of two similar parcels of land
after PCB cleanup; broker who disclosed is still trying to sell the property, while the one
who withheld information has sold his parcel).
[Vol. 41
44
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss4/5
REDUCING THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
of undeveloped property that requires no delay.322
Even without ECRA provisions, the cost of audits coupled with
delays must be factored into the decision to purchase an existing site.
Further, if the audit reveals environmental problems, additional delays
will be encountered while a remedy is negotiated and either imple-
mented or purchase of the site is abandoned. Abandonment at this
stage, however, entails considerable delay.
Should the purchase of a suspect site be considered, the means of
solving any future problems must be analyzed and negotiated. This
consumes additional expense in the form of legal fees for drafting pro-
visions for the contract of sale. Furthermore, these provisions can be
quite sophisticated and may require significant additional engineering
and scientific analysis of the facility.
On the whole, substantial prepurchase costs generally are encoun-
tered by the industrial site purchaser. Moreover, these costs do not al-
ways prevent later costs or delays. In comparison, nonindustrial land
offers minimal initial costs and virtual assurance that any future envi-
ronmental problems will be due to the buyer's activities at the site, and
thus will be preventable.
2. Insurance
Purchasers of any property will find retroactive environmental im-
pairment liability insurance completely unavailable.32 3 The purchaser
of virgin property can take solace in the fact that he should not need
it; the purchaser of an existing industrial site enjoys no such comfot.
For the limited-scope insurance that is available, the existing site
purchaser can expect to pay for an extensive initial audit. Additionally,
to cover the possibility that the audit missed something, the existing
site purchaser will face higher insurance premiums for the life of the
policy.3
24
In sum, the existing site carries a hidden cost that includes self-
insurance to cover past activities plus the cost of higher premiums to
cover activities prospectively. A real possibility exists that no insurance
will be available at all, and that the purchaser must fully self-insure.
322. "[Pleople who want to construct new facilities on old sites ... must make sure
that the soil is cleaned up to ECRA guidelines. As a result, they may be precluded from
using the site because it will take years before the building can be built." Highland, Can
Someone Else Besides a Lawyer Determine Who Really Is Innocent?, in BURDENS OF
ENVRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 45, at 25; see also supra note 280 and accompa-
nying text.
323. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
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3. Lenders
Obviously, lenders have concerns as well. 325 While refusal to ser-
vice all industrial site purchasers is not realistic, 326 careful selection of
purchasers is crucial. Therefore, the prospective borrower must face
the possibility of refusal of loan applications simply on the basis of
environmental considerations. As part of the application process, the
lender may require an independent audit, which adds to cost and in-
creases delay. Furthermore, in an effort to mitigate the risk of a defi-
cient audit, lenders often will charge higher interest rates. Finally, the
lender may condition the loan on the successful purchase of environ-
mental impairment liability insurance, which, as noted previously,
sometimes is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.
B. Result
The industrial site purchaser must consider many factors when lo-
cating a new facility, but environmental concerns are foremost among
them. Unquantifiable risk presents a tremendous barrier to any pro-
posed sale. To quantify the risk requires travelling down at least one of
two avenues, although some combination would seem most likely. The
first requires extensive investigation; the second requires a form of in-
demnification. Both result in increased transaction costs and delays.
Furthermore, in some cases adequate indemnification from the seller or
an independent insurer may be unavailable. This potential for no in-
demnification coupled with possible long-term financing at an in-
creased interest rate make it unlikely that a purchaser will look favora-
bly on an existing industrial site.
Instead, the purchaser will opt for the virgin site if financially fea-
sible, since infrastructure and facility construction costs, while not
cheap, are readily ascertainable. Although CERCLA liability propels
caution even in the purchase of apparent virgin locations, the increase
in transactional costs and delays simply is not comparable. The virgin
site provides quantifiable risk and an opportunity for the industrial fa-
cility to start with a clean slate.
The full cost of CERCLA liability promotes consumption of virgin
property over existing industrial property, even when existing sites
may appear, on the surface, less expensive. While the purchaser may
not realize the source of the influences that are compelling this choice,
the purchaser must nevertheless respond to it.
325, See supra notes 240-58 and accompanying text.
326, See supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
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C. Proposal
States considering some form of ECRA, Superlien, or Notice type
of legislation should simultaneously consider the impact such laws
have on consumption of undeveloped land. This Article recommends a
concept for reducing the negative impact CERCLA has on industrial
site selection. This proposal makes two assumptions.
First, it assumes that reuse of industrial property is socially more
desirable than abandonment. Some arguments exist that public health
could be better protected if such property were abandoned, rather than
subjected to possibly ineffective cleanup.3217 Additionally, the cost of re-
medial work might be greatly reduced if cleanup standards eventually
become post-cleanup use-conscious, -and if the post-cleanup use were
designated to prevent human occupancy. However, the unrelenting
downward trend of required cleanup levels, preventing both cost reduc-
tions and worker injury, defeat both of these arguments. Therefore the
assumption remains valid.
Second, the proposal assumes that consumption of virgin land is
undesirable. In states of currently limited industrial capacity, with lit-
tle to offer growing industry in the way of existing industrial sites, con-
sumption of virgin land may be preferred over expansion out of state.
But any existing locations can be effectively cleaned and reused, if
enough impetus is brought to the market. 2
The proposal consists simply of a one time tax or impact fee on
undeveloped property collected in the year the land is converted to
industrial use. Industrial use would be defined by selected standard
industrial classification schemes, with the provision that companies
could rebut the presumption that they purchase, use, manufacture,
generate, store, transport or dispose of hazardous substances. Since al-
most all industry uses some hazardous substances, a scale might be de-
veloped that would tax heavier users more, thereby encouraging mini-
mization. Again, this could be set up on a presumptive basis imposing
a set tax, but deductions for minimization would be available.
The tax proceeds could be used to offset costs of redeveloping ex-
isting industrial sites through the funding of state superfunds-at least
to the extent permitted by Exxon Corp. v. Hunt.32 9 In Exxon the court
327. For example, the EPA has proposed removal of a contaminated site from the
National Priorities List (NPL) without cleanup. See EPA Region III Proposes to Re-
move Pennsylvania Site from NPL Without Cleanup, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1868 (Mar.
16, 1990).
328. See Lehman, Toxic Waste Poses Problem For Developers, Washington Post,
Feb. 21, 1987, at El, col. 6 (Timberline condominium project sits on a cleaned midnight
dump site.).
329. 475 U.S. 355 (1986).
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permitted the use of special state taxes only to the extent that they do
not overlap with the CERCLA Superfund.3 0 This permits states to tax
for the ten percent minimum cleanup cost burden CERCLA places on
the states. Congress apparently tried to overturn the Supreme Court's
limitation by deleting from CERCLA the language cited by the
court. 31 The New Jersey Supreme Court apparently believed this to be
the case, avoiding the United States Supreme Court's instructions on
remand.3 32
South Carolina, for example, currently funds its state superfund
program from taxes on commercial hazardous waste land disposal
within the state. 33 But this approach suffers from disposal-oriented
problems. 334 As a deterrent to waste production, the state's current
"rear-end" approach relies on the "trickle-up" theory that future lia-
bility will compel disposers to act responsibly today. Of course this
theory presumes knowledge, not only of liability, but of ways to act
responsibly, after the waste is generated. Obviously, waiting until this
late stage severely limits the number of options available.
A more sound approach would encourage the potential generator
to evaluate his activities before the waste is generated. An undeveloped
land impact fee for hazardous substance users would have this addi-
tional beneficial effect. Furthermore, it would allow the opportunity to
reduce (or avoid future increase of) taxes on waste-end disposal. Such
taxes have always been a concern, since they may drive proper disposal
costs up to a point at which some generators may be encouraged to
improperly dispose. Another interesting effect of the impact fee on the
conversion of undeveloped property is that it allows the fiscal resource
base to be tied automatically to the growth in hazardous substance
activity.
V. CONCLUSION
CERCLA mobilizes the marketplace to force hazard abatement.
Banks and insurance companies now demand that their borrowers and
policyholders reflect the true cost of their production activities, includ-
ing environmental impairment, in their operating budgets. Companies
no longer are able to easily externalize these costs. The marketplace
330. Id. at 376,
331. See 132 CONG. REC. S14912 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Lautenburg).
332. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 109 N.J. 110, 126, 534 A.2d 1, 9-10 (1987).
333. Address by Roger Davis, vice president, GSX Services, University of South
Carolina Environmental Law Society (Mar. 31, 1988).
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now works to prohibit transferring these costs from the profit-maker
onto the unsuspecting, taxpaying public without public consent. This
radically alters a previous "right" to literally dispose of one's real prop-
erty as one sees fit. The marketplace now attaches responsibility, in
conjunction with rights, to the ownership of real property. This has
wrenched the activities of hazardous substance producing and consum-
ing companies, creating an economic climate that deters future mis-
handling of hazardous substances.
Unfortunately, while CERCLA unleashed marketplace forces for
protection of the environment, it inadvertently created marketplace in-
centives to consume undeveloped land. Simple removal of these incen-
tives would undo the progress that CERCLA has achieved for the envi-
ronment. Therefore, the incentives to consume virgin land must be
counterbalanced by new disincentives. Such disincentives might in-
clude conversion impact fees, which would require a payment for the
right to use previously noncommercial property for activities that
would produce or consume hazardous substances. If disincentives alone
are politically unpalatable, they may be combined with incentives to
redevelop existing commercial locations.
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